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The beam and the mote : on blame, standing, and normativity /

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Most believe that even if one has done something blameworthy, one can dismiss blame on that account when it comes from a hypocritical blamer. This book examines the nature and ethics of standingless hypocritical blame. It argues that hypocrites lack standing to blame by virtue of their lack of commi...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper, 1964- (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2023]
Subjects:
Blame.
Hypocrisy.
Blâme.
Hypocrisie.
Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
PHILOSOPHY.
Political.
Social.
Blame
Hypocrisy
Religion & beliefs.
Religion.
Electronic books.
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • The Beam and the Mote
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction
  • I.1. Topic and Main Aims
  • I.2. Structure
  • I.3. Significance
  • 1. Hypocritical Blame
  • 1.1. Introduction
  • 1.2. When Is Blame Hypocritical?
  • 1.2.1. The Blaming Condition
  • 1.2.2. The Incoherence Condition
  • 1.2.3. The No-​Self-​Blame Condition
  • 1.2.4. The No-​Justification Condition
  • 1.2.5. Summary
  • 1.3. Standing to Blame and Its Denial
  • 1.4. Other Accounts of What It Is to Dismiss Blame on Grounds of the Hypocrite's Lack of Standing
  • 1.5. Conclusion
  • 2. Complications and Defeaters of Standing
  • 2.1. Introduction
  • 2.2. Private Blame
  • 2.3. Self-​Blame
  • 2.4. Third-​Person Blame
  • 2.5. Degrees of Blame and Degrees of Standing
  • 2.6. Skepticism about Standing to Blame
  • 2.7. Why Does Hypocrisy Undermine Standing to Blame?
  • 2.8. Conclusion
  • 3. What, If Anything, Makes Hypocritical Blame Morally Wrong?
  • 3.1. Introduction
  • 3.2. Lack of Desert
  • 3.3. Lack of Commitment
  • 3.4. Wrong Attention
  • 3.5. Transgression of Moral Authority
  • 3.6. Failure of Reciprocity
  • 3.7. Moral Community
  • 3.8. Implying Falsehoods
  • 3.9. A Clash with Moral Equality
  • 3.10. Conclusion
  • 4. Other Ways of Not Having a Standing to Blame
  • 4.1. Introduction
  • 4.2. Tu Quoque
  • 4.3. Complicity
  • 4.4. None of Your Business
  • 4.5. "You Don't Know What It's Like"
  • 4.6. "You Don't Accept That Principle Yourself"
  • 4.7. Conclusion
  • 5. Praising
  • 5.1. Introduction
  • 5.2. What Is Praising?
  • 5.3. Standing to Praise
  • 5.4. Hypocritical Praise
  • 5.5. The Wrongfulness of Hypocritical Praise
  • 5.6. Other Forms of Standingless Praise
  • 5.7. Standing to Prame
  • 5.8. Conclusion
  • 6. Forgiving
  • 6.1. Introduction
  • 6.2. What Is It to Forgive?
  • 6.3. Dismissing Forgiveness as Standingless
  • 6.4. Hypocritical Forgiving
  • 6.5. What Undermines Standing to Forgive?
  • 6.6. The Wrongfulness of Hypocritical Forgiveness
  • 6.7. Other Ways in Which Forgiving Can Be Standingless
  • 6.8. Fromtaking
  • 6.9. Conclusion
  • 6.10. Appendix: Forgiving and Standing to Apologize
  • 7. Morality, Normativity, and Standing
  • 7.1. Introduction
  • 7.2. Encouraging
  • 7.3. Epistemic Blame
  • 7.4. Consequentialism, Deontology, and the Interpersonal Nature of Holding Accountable
  • 7.5. Standing and Moral Encroachment
  • 7.6. Conclusion
  • Bibliography
  • Index