Thieves, opportunists, and autocrats : building regulatory states in Russia and Kazakhstan /
"This book examines how Russia and Kazakhstan navigated the dilemmas associated with building regulatory state institutions on the ruins of the Soviet command and control system. The two nations developed predatory and wasteful crony capitalism but still improved their business climates and eco...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
New York :
Oxford University Press,
[2023]
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Connect to the full text of this electronic book |
Table of Contents:
- Cover
- Thieves, Opportunists, and Autocrats: Building Regulatory States in Russia and Kazakhstan
- Copyright
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- List of Frequently Used Abbreviations
- Note on Translation and Transliteration
- Introduction
- Why Russia and Kazakhstan?
- The Regulatory State in Autocratic Regimes: Definitions and the Argument
- Thieves and Autocrats
- The Opportunists
- Data, Methods, and Anecdotes
- The Roadmap
- 1 Regulatory State-Building and Authoritarian Survival
- Separating Regulatory Policy and Its Implementation
- Bureaucratic Discretion and the Business Climate
- Business Responses
- Politicians' Dilemma
- State Control of Bureaucracy
- Empirical Implications and Hypotheses
- Regulations and Economic Outcomes
- Regulations and Corruption
- Administrative Resources and Economic Outcomes
- Discretionary Power and Political Survival
- Summary
- 2 The Evolution of the Russian Regulatory State: Regulatory Vacuum, Regulatory Maze, and Regulatory Guillotine
- Formal Documents and State Regulatory Functions
- Regulatory Corpus
- Russian Regulatory State
- Economic Liberalization and the Regulatory Vacuum of the 1990s
- Successes and Failures of Alexey Kudrin's Reforms
- Administrative Reforms
- Continuing Simplification of Regulatory Procedures
- Continuing Regulatory Failures
- The Regulatory Guillotine
- Regional and Municipal Regulations
- Sources of Variation in Regional and Municipal Regulations
- Regulatory Specificity
- Conclusion
- 3 Regulatory Details and Economic Development in Kazakhstan
- Kazakh Regulatory State
- Reforms of Economic Governance
- Administrative and Civil Service Reforms
- Development of the Regulatory Corpus
- Quantifying Regulatory Change
- Assessing Bureaucratic Discretion
- Testing Economic Effects of Discretion.
- Modeling Fixed Capital Investment
- Modeling Small Business Activity and Revenue
- Endogeneity
- Streamlining Government Operations and Business Development
- Conclusion
- 4 Bureaucratic Discretion and State Capacity in Russian Regions
- State Capacity
- Regulatory Burden, Administrative Capacity, and Business Climate
- Economic Outcomes: Capital Investment and the SME Sector
- Regional Variation in Regulatory Institutions
- Measuring Administrative Capacity
- Statistical Analysis
- Modeling Fixed Capital Investment
- Modeling SME Development
- Modeling Small Business Revenues
- Conclusion
- 5 Institutional Controls and Autocratic Survival
- Russia and Kazakhstan Between Discretion and Constraint
- Kazakhstan
- Russia
- Discretion and Political Survival
- Data and Measurement
- Kazakhstan
- Russia
- Regional Protests in Russia
- Conclusion
- 6 Bureaucratic Discretion and Business Climate around the World
- Macro-level Measures of Discretion, the Business Climate, and Regulations
- Discretion
- Business Climate
- Regulations
- Data Analysis
- Assessing the Direct Effects of Discretion
- Discretion and Business Climate
- Additional Evidence from Business Surveys
- Causal Mechanism
- Conclusion
- 7 Towards a Theory of the Authoritarian Regulatory State
- Regulatory State and Eurasian Autocracies
- Bureaucratic Discretion, Autocratic Impunity, and Grand Corruption
- Beyond the Russian and Kazakh Cases
- Political Regimes and Regulatory States
- Corruption by Design
- Authoritarian Regulatory State and the Rule of Law
- Institutional Capacity
- Growth and Development
- Political Limitation of Autocratic Regulatory States
- APPENDIX A Formal Argument
- Discretionary Power
- Regulatory Compliance under Constrained Bureaucracy
- Regulatory Compliance under Discretionary Bureaucracy.
- APPENDIX B Results of Vector Autoregressions
- APPENDIX C Sample Regulatory Document
- APPENDIX D Validity of the Empirical Measure of Regulatory Specificity
- APPENDIX E Modeling Independent and Interactive Effects of Discretion on Business Climate
- Business Survey Data Analysis
- References
- Index.