rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Thieves, opportunists, and autocrats
    sub title: building regulatory states in Russia and Kazakhstan
  name:
    name part: Duvanova, Dinissa
    name part: 1977-
    role:
      role term: creator
    role:
      role term: author.
  type of resource: text
  genre: bibliography
  genre: Electronic books.
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: nyu
    date issued: 2023
    copyright date: 2023
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: remote
    extent: 1 online resource.
  abstract: "This book examines how Russia and Kazakhstan navigated the dilemmas associated with building regulatory state institutions on the ruins of the Soviet command and control system. The two nations developed predatory and wasteful crony capitalism but still improved their business climates and economic performance. To better understand these seemingly incompatible outcomes, the book advances a theory of authoritarian regulatory statehood. It argues that politicians use institutions of the state as a means to balance conflicting elite demands for economic rents and popular demands for public goods and economic growth. An effective balancing of the two prevents elite subversion and popular revolt in the short run and ensures elites' continued access to economic rents in the long run. Empirical analysis of nearly a million national and regional regulatory documents enacted in Russia and Kazakhstan between 1990 and 2020 shows that formal regulatory institutions the autocrats built have a profound effect on economic outcomes. Moreover, at times of political vulnerability, autocracies use formal regulatory mechanisms to discipline state agencies responsible for policy implementation. By reducing capricious policy implementation by the regulatory bureaucracy, autocrats are able to reinvigorate economic performance and rebalance elite and popular interests. The theoretical argument advanced in the book links the use of institutional instruments of policy implementation to the political survival strategy. This study effectively shows that regulatory state building has emerged as an effective tool for strengthening autocratic regimes and enhancing their long-term survival"--
  table of contents: Cover -- Thieves, Opportunists, and Autocrats: Building Regulatory States in Russia and Kazakhstan -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- List of Frequently Used Abbreviations -- Note on Translation and Transliteration -- Introduction -- Why Russia and Kazakhstan? -- The Regulatory State in Autocratic Regimes: Definitions and the Argument -- Thieves and Autocrats -- The Opportunists -- Data, Methods, and Anecdotes -- The Roadmap -- 1 Regulatory State-Building and Authoritarian Survival -- Separating Regulatory Policy and Its Implementation -- Bureaucratic Discretion and the Business Climate -- Business Responses -- Politicians' Dilemma -- State Control of Bureaucracy -- Empirical Implications and Hypotheses -- Regulations and Economic Outcomes -- Regulations and Corruption -- Administrative Resources and Economic Outcomes -- Discretionary Power and Political Survival -- Summary -- 2 The Evolution of the Russian Regulatory State: Regulatory Vacuum, Regulatory Maze, and Regulatory Guillotine -- Formal Documents and State Regulatory Functions -- Regulatory Corpus -- Russian Regulatory State -- Economic Liberalization and the Regulatory Vacuum of the 1990s -- Successes and Failures of Alexey Kudrin's Reforms -- Administrative Reforms -- Continuing Simplification of Regulatory Procedures -- Continuing Regulatory Failures -- The Regulatory Guillotine -- Regional and Municipal Regulations -- Sources of Variation in Regional and Municipal Regulations -- Regulatory Specificity -- Conclusion -- 3 Regulatory Details and Economic Development in Kazakhstan -- Kazakh Regulatory State -- Reforms of Economic Governance -- Administrative and Civil Service Reforms -- Development of the Regulatory Corpus -- Quantifying Regulatory Change -- Assessing Bureaucratic Discretion -- Testing Economic Effects of Discretion.
  table of contents: Modeling Fixed Capital Investment -- Modeling Small Business Activity and Revenue -- Endogeneity -- Streamlining Government Operations and Business Development -- Conclusion -- 4 Bureaucratic Discretion and State Capacity in Russian Regions -- State Capacity -- Regulatory Burden, Administrative Capacity, and Business Climate -- Economic Outcomes: Capital Investment and the SME Sector -- Regional Variation in Regulatory Institutions -- Measuring Administrative Capacity -- Statistical Analysis -- Modeling Fixed Capital Investment -- Modeling SME Development -- Modeling Small Business Revenues -- Conclusion -- 5 Institutional Controls and Autocratic Survival -- Russia and Kazakhstan Between Discretion and Constraint -- Kazakhstan -- Russia -- Discretion and Political Survival -- Data and Measurement -- Kazakhstan -- Russia -- Regional Protests in Russia -- Conclusion -- 6 Bureaucratic Discretion and Business Climate around the World -- Macro-level Measures of Discretion, the Business Climate, and Regulations -- Discretion -- Business Climate -- Regulations -- Data Analysis -- Assessing the Direct Effects of Discretion -- Discretion and Business Climate -- Additional Evidence from Business Surveys -- Causal Mechanism -- Conclusion -- 7 Towards a Theory of the Authoritarian Regulatory State -- Regulatory State and Eurasian Autocracies -- Bureaucratic Discretion, Autocratic Impunity, and Grand Corruption -- Beyond the Russian and Kazakh Cases -- Political Regimes and Regulatory States -- Corruption by Design -- Authoritarian Regulatory State and the Rule of Law -- Institutional Capacity -- Growth and Development -- Political Limitation of Autocratic Regulatory States -- APPENDIX A Formal Argument -- Discretionary Power -- Regulatory Compliance under Constrained Bureaucracy -- Regulatory Compliance under Discretionary Bureaucracy.
  table of contents: APPENDIX B Results of Vector Autoregressions -- APPENDIX C Sample Regulatory Document -- APPENDIX D Validity of the Empirical Measure of Regulatory Specificity -- APPENDIX E Modeling Independent and Interactive Effects of Discretion on Business Climate -- Business Survey Data Analysis -- References -- Index.
  note: Dinissa Duvanova.
  note: Includes bibliographical references and index.
  subject:
    geographic code: e-ru---
    geographic code: a-kz---
  subject:
    topic: Trade regulation
    geographic: Russia (Federation)
  subject:
    topic: Post-communism
    topic: Economic aspects
    geographic: Russia (Federation)
  subject:
    topic: Political corruption
    geographic: Russia (Federation)
  subject:
    topic: Trade regulation
    geographic: Kazakhstan
  subject:
    topic: Post-communism
    topic: Economic aspects
    geographic: Kazakhstan
  subject:
    topic: Political corruption
    geographic: Kazakhstan
  subject:
    topic: Commerce
    topic: Réglementation
    geographic: Russie
  subject:
    topic: Postcommunisme
    topic: Aspect économique
    geographic: Russie
  subject:
    topic: Corruption (Politique)
    geographic: Russie
  subject:
    topic: Commerce
    topic: Réglementation
    geographic: Kazakhstan
  subject:
    topic: Postcommunisme
    topic: Aspect économique
    geographic: Kazakhstan
  subject:
    topic: Corruption (Politique)
    geographic: Kazakhstan
  subject:
    topic: Political corruption
  subject:
    topic: Post-communism
    topic: Economic aspects
  subject:
    topic: Trade regulation
  subject:
    geographic: Kazakhstan
  subject:
    geographic: Russia (Federation)
  subject:
    topic: Industry & industrial studies
  subject:
    topic: Industry
  classification: HD3612.R83 D883 2023
  classification: 338.8/8847
  related item:
    title info:
      title: Thieves, opportunists, and autocrats
    name:
      name part: Duvanova, Dinissa, 1977-
    identifier: (DLC) 2023006088
    identifier: (OCoLC)1377702198
  related item:
    identifier: (DLC) 2023006088
  identifier: 9780197697801
  identifier: 0197697801
  identifier: 9780197697764
  identifier: 0197697763
  identifier: 9780197697771
  identifier: 0197697771
  identifier: http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login
  record info:
    record content source: UIU
    record creation date: 230801
    record change date: 20260318165732.9
    record identifier: in00005698554
    language of cataloging:
      language term: eng