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EU values before the Court of Justice : foundations, potential, risks /

Luke Dimitrios Spieker's EU Values Before the Court of Justice provides a first comprehensive study of the judicial mobilisation of Article 2 TEU. Spieker goes far beyond the current focus on illiberal developments in the Member States, setting out to explore the multifaceted potential of Artic...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Spieker, Luke Dimitrios (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2023.
Edition:First edition.
Series:Oxford studies in European law.
Subjects:
Court of Justice of the European Union.
Court of Justice of the European Union
Rule of law > European Union countries.
Règle de droit > Pays de l'Union européenne.
Rule of law
European Union countries
International law.
Law.
Electronic books.
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • List of Abbreviations Bibliographical Note
  • Introduction
  • I. Objectives
  • II. Focus
  • III. Structure
  • IV. Method
  • PART I FOUNDATIONS
  • 1. Practice: The Rise of Article 2 TEU in the Court's Jurisprudence
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Emergence
  • A. From Rome to Amsterdam: Initial Neglect
  • B. From Amsterdam to Lisbon: Growing Engagement
  • III. Breakthrough: Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses
  • A. Innovation
  • B. Reception
  • IV. Spread
  • A. Procedural Extension
  • B. Substantive Extension
  • 2. Doctrine: The Judicial Applicability of Article 2 TEU
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Legal Normativity
  • A. Text
  • 1. Principles and values: The blurry lines of legal theory
  • 2. Principles and values: Comparative considerations
  • 3. Principles and values: The shifting Treaty semantics
  • B. System
  • C. History
  • 1. The emergence of values in EU law
  • 2. The Convention on the Future of Europe
  • D. Values as Normative Reinforcement?
  • III. Justiciability
  • A. Current Practice: Operationalizing Article 2 TEU Through Specific Provisions
  • B. Future Outlook: Towards a Freestanding Application of Article 2 TEU?
  • 1. Negative approach
  • 2. Positive approach
  • IV. Jurisdiction
  • A. No General Exclusivity of Political Procedures
  • B. No Partial Exclusivity of Political Procedures Beyond the Scope of EU Law
  • 3. Theory: The Dual Character of Article 2 TEU
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Premises
  • A. A Constitutional Approach
  • B. A Multidimensional Approach
  • III. The Dual Character of Article 2 TEU
  • A. Verbund Dimension: Article 2 TEU as Manifestation of a Thin Constitutionalism
  • B. EU Dimension: Article 2 TEU as Manifestation of a Thick Constitutionalism
  • IV. Summing Up
  • PART II 'THE UNION IS FOUNDED ON THE VALUES...': POTENTIAL IN THE EU DIMENSION
  • 4. Article 2 TEU as Constitutional Core of the EU Legal Order
  • I. Introduction
  • II. In Search of the Union's Constitution
  • A. Jurisprudence
  • B. Scholarship
  • III. Towards an Article 2 TEU-based Constitution
  • A. Method
  • B. Contours
  • IV. Effect: Substantive Hierarchies in EU Primary Law
  • 5. The Court and the Treaties: Fostering Coherence
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Establishing Coherence in Primary Law
  • A. Limited Instruments
  • B. Outdated Outcomes
  • III. The Potential of Article 2 TEU
  • A. The Court in Search for Coherence: Objectives and Principles
  • B. Fostering Coherence by Recourse to Article 2 TEU
  • 1. Potential for interpretation
  • 2. Potential for conflict resolution
  • 6. The Court and the Legislature: Encouraging Legislation
  • I. Introduction
  • II. An Overly Constrained EU Legislature
  • A. The Treaty Level: Extensive Primary Law
  • B. The Institutional Level: A Strong Court of Justice
  • III. The Potential of Article 2 TEU
  • A. The Court Between Responsiveness and Resistance
  • B. From 'Over' to 'De-constitutionalization'
  • 7. The Court and the Treaty Makers: Constraining Treaty Revision
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Unconstrained Treaty Makers?
  • A. Explicit Procedural but Implicit Substantive Constraints?
  • B. The Court's Enigmatic Position
  • III. The Potential of Article 2 TEU
  • A. Article 2 TEU as a Justiciable Limit of Treaty Revisions?
  • 1. Substantive limitations
  • 2. Justiciability
  • B. Potential Objections
  • 1. Primary and secondary constituent power in the EU
  • 2. The dead hand of the past
  • PART III THESE VALUES ARE COMMON TO THE MEMBER STATES...: POTENTIAL IN THE VERBUND DIMENSION
  • 8. Article 2 TEU as Constitutional Frame of the Verbund
  • I. Introduction
  • II. What Holds a Federal System Together?
  • A. Constitutional Homogeneity in Federal Systems
  • B. Constitutional Homogeneity in the Verbund
  • III. Article 2 TEU as a Framework for Constitutional Homogeneity Claims
  • A. Three Claims
  • B. Three Functions
  • IV. Guaranteeing Constitutional Homogeneity Through the EU Judicial System
  • 9. Top-Down Review
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Countering Illiberal Developments in the Member States
  • A. Institutionally: Why the Court?
  • B. Substantively: What Legal Basis?
  • III. The Potential of Article 2 TEU
  • A. ASJP or How to Kill Two Birds with One Stone
  • B. Beyond ASJP: Operationalizing the Values of 'Human Rights' and 'Democracy'
  • 10. Horizontal Review
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Direct Review Through Infringement Actions
  • A. Involving Member States in Policing Value Compliance: The Shortcomings of Political Procedures
  • B. Peer Pressure Beyond Political Procedures: Article 259 TEUT
  • III. Indirect Review Through Mutual Recognition Regimes
  • A. Horizontal Solange
  • 1. Mutual recognition regimes: Gateways for rule of law and fundamental rights considerations
  • 2. The far-reaching effects of horizontal Solange
  • B. Making Better Use of Mutual Recognition Regimes
  • 1. Current shortcomings
  • 2. Beyond the European Arrest Warrant: Increasing the stakes for non-compliant Member States
  • 11. Bottom-Up Review
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Tapping the Potential of Constitutional Identity Reviews
  • A. Institutionally: Moving Towards a More Relational Approach
  • B. Substantively: Moving Away from Article 4(2) TEU
  • III. The Potential of Article 2 TEU
  • A. Formulating Identity as Common Value Concerns
  • 1. Substantive level
  • 2. Procedural level
  • B. What's In It for National Constitutional Courts?
  • PART IV RISKS AND RECALIBRATION
  • 12. Towards a Tyranny of EU Values?
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Jeopardizing the Rule of Law: Article 2 TEU as a Gateway for CJEU Judges' Politics, Morality, or Ideology?
  • A. Value Concretization
  • 1. The indeterminacy objection
  • 2. Rejoinders
  • B. Value Conflicts
  • 1. The balancing objection
  • 2. Rejoinders
  • III. Jeopardizing Democracy: Article 2 TEU as a Path to a European Gouvernement des Juges?
  • A. Diagonal Tensions
  • 1. The counter-majoritarian objection
  • 2. Rejoinders
  • B. Horizontal Tensions
  • 1. The judicial overreach objection
  • 2. Rejoinders
  • 13. Disrupting the Federal Balance?
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Concerns for the Federal Balance
  • A. Competence and Identity
  • 1. Article 5(1) TEU: the ultra-vires objection
  • 2. Article 4(2) TEU: the identity objection
  • B. Pluralism and Diversity
  • 1. Normative level: the constitutional pluralism objection
  • 2. Factual level: the diversity objection
  • III. Limiting the Impact of Article 2 TEU in the Verbund Dimension
  • A. Limiting the Obligations in Article 2 TEU
  • 1. Minimum obligations
  • 2. Red lines, regression, and results
  • B. Limiting the Enforcement of Article 2 TEU
  • 1.Limitingenforcement by the EU
  • 2. Limiting enforcement by the Court of Justice
  • Conclusions
  • Bibliography
  • Index