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A unified treatment of Moore's paradox : belief, knowledge, assertion and rationality /

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"A Unified Treatment of Moore's Paradox is the culmination of a decades-long engagement with Moore's paradox by the world's leading authority on the subject, the late John Williams. The book offers a comprehensive account of Moore's paradox in thought and speech, both in its...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Williams, John N. (John Nicholas), 1952- (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, [2023]
Subjects:
Moore, G. E. > (George Edward), > 1873-1958.
Moore, G. E. > (George Edward), > 1873-1958
Paradox.
Knowledge, Theory of.
Belief and doubt.
Philosophy of mind.
Paradoxe.
Théorie de la connaissance.
Croyance et doute.
Philosophie de l'esprit.
epistemology.
PHILOSOPHY.
Mind & Body.
Modern.
History & Surveys.
Philosophy of mind
Knowledge, Theory of
Belief and doubt
Paradox
Philosophy: logic.
Philosophy.
Electronic books.
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • A Unified Treatment of Moore's Paradox: Belief, Knowledge, Assertion, and Rationality
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgements
  • Foreword
  • 1. What Moore's Paradox is
  • 2. Why Moore's Paradox Matters
  • 3. Contributions of this Book
  • 4. John's Broader Contributions: Moore's Paradox and Beyond
  • 5. Personal Reflections
  • References
  • 1: Introducing Moore's Paradox
  • 1.1 A Very Brief History
  • 1.2 Aims
  • 2: Moore on Moore's Paradox
  • 2.1 Moore's Omissive and Commissive Paradox
  • 2.2 Moore's Problem as Paradox
  • 2.3 Moore's Knowledge Version
  • 2.4 Moore's Two Solutions
  • 3: Wittgenstein on Moore's Paradox
  • 3.1 Wittgenstein's Reaction
  • 3.2 Report of Belief as Assertion
  • 3.3 Wittgenstein's Expressivist Approach
  • 3.4 Moorean Utterances without Moore-Paradoxical Assertion
  • 3.5 Distinguishing Features of Moore-Paradoxical Assertion
  • 4: Some Salient Approaches to Omissive and Commissive Moore-Paradoxical Assertion
  • 4.1 Non-verbal Moore-Paradoxical Assertions
  • 4.2 Partly Non-assertoric Analogues
  • 4.3 Hintikka's Priority Thesis
  • 4.4 Sorensen's Contribution
  • 4.5 Chan's Example of MSN Messenger
  • 4.6 'Self-referential' Moore-Paradoxical Assertions
  • 4.7 Sorensen's Commitment Approach
  • 4.8 Rosenthal's Assertibility Approach
  • 4.9 Shoemaker's Priority Thesis
  • 4.10 Green's Normative Approach
  • 4.11 Vahid's Defective Interpretation Approach
  • 4.12 Pagin's Informativeness Approach
  • 4.13 Crimmins's Example
  • 4.14 Pruss's Examples: Expert, Earthquake, and Robot
  • 4.15 Schwitzgebel's Juliet the Implicit Racist
  • 4.16 Turri's Ellie the Eliminativist
  • 4.17 Hájek's Dialetheist
  • 4.18 Douven's Priority Thesis
  • 5: Expressing Belief and Knowledge, Assertion, and the Expressivist Approach
  • 5.1 The Need for an Analysis of Assertion
  • 5.2 Expressing Belief, Conviction, or Knowledge
  • 5.3 An Analysis of Assertion
  • 5.4 Utterance Without Assertion
  • 5.5 Back to Pruss: Earthquake and Robot
  • 5.6 Expressing Lack of Belief or Knowledge via Assertion
  • 5.7 An Expressivist Account of Omissive and Commissive Absurdity
  • 5.8 The Expressivist Account and Other Examples of Moore-Paradoxical Assertion
  • 5.9 The Expressivist Account and the Knowledge Version in Assertion
  • 6: An Account of Belief
  • 6.1 Belief without Qualification, or 'Occurrent' Belief
  • 6.2 Judgement
  • 6.3 Dispositional Beliefs
  • 6.4 Conscious Beliefs
  • 6.5 Unconscious Beliefs
  • 6.6 The Possibility of Overtly Contradictory Beliefs
  • 6.7 Searle's Principle
  • 6.8 Belief as Assignment of Subjective Probability and Degrees of Conviction
  • 7: Some Salient Approaches to Moore's Paradox in Belief
  • 7.1 Hintikka's Epistemic Logic Approach
  • 7.2 A Digression: Pruss's Three Objections to Belief-Distribution
  • 7.3 Back to Hintikka's Epistemic Logic Approach
  • 7.4 Sorensen's Contribution
  • 7.5 Sorensen's Iterated Cases