http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
1 online resource (xxii, 317 pages) : illustrations
"Is free will an illusion? Is addiction a brain disease? Can neuroscience be trusted to read the minds of criminals and consumers? Neuroethics answers these and other ethical questions raised by brain science through captivating cases, philosophical analysis, and scientific evidence. The book covers core topics such as: free will, addiction, mental illness, brain manipulation, moral enhancement, brain images as legal evidence, the reliability of moral intuitions, and even misconduct in neuroscience. By soberly scrutinizing the science and avoiding alarmist reactions, a "nuanced neuroethics" is developed which reconceives human agency as less conscious and reliable but more diverse and flexible than we ordinarily think. A central lesson for medicine, law, ethics, cognitive science, and public policy is that disordered and neurotypical minds are more alike than they are different"--
Part I. Introduction -- 1. Ethics meets neuroscience -- 1.1 Kevin's Klüver-Bucy Syndrome -- 1.2 What is neuroethics? -- 1.3 What's to come -- 1.4 Conclusion -- Appendix: Philosophy and brain primers -- A.1 Philosophy primer -- A.2 Brain basics -- Part II. Autonomy -- 2. Free will -- 2.1 Weinstein's window -- 2.2 What in the world is free will? -- 2.3 Determinism: no choice? -- 2.4 Physicalism: no control? -- 2.5 Epiphenomenalism: no coherence? -- 2.6 Conclusion -- 3. Manipulating brains -- 3.1 A Parkinson's patient -- 3.2 What's the problem? -- 3.3 Patient autonomy -- 3.4 Personal identity -- 3.5 Unreliable risk-benefit ratios -- 3.6 Conclusion -- Part III. Care -- 4. Mental disorder -- 4.1 Two homicides in Texas -- 4.2 Two theories -- 4.3 The need for nuance -- 4.4 Ethical implications -- 4.5 Conclusion -- 5. Addiction -- 5.1 Reprimand for relapse -- 5.2 What is addiction? -- 5.3 Loss of control in addiction? -- 5.4 Is addiction a brain disease? -- 5.5 Addiction as a disorder -- 5.6 Conclusion -- Part IV. Character -- 6. Moral judgment -- 6.1 Dugan's defense -- 6.2 Are gut feelings necessary? -- 6.3 Are gut feelings always reliable? -- 6.4 Conclusion -- 7. Moral enhancement -- 7.1 Microdosing morality -- 7.2 A presumptive case for enhancement -- 7.3 Ethical concerns -- 7.4 Conclusion -- Part V. Justice -- 8. Motivated reasoning -- 8.1 Split-brain self-deception -- 8.2 Reasoning motivated by values -- 8.3 Bias in (neuro)science -- 8.4 What motivates scientists? -- 8.5 Conclusion -- 9. Brain reading -- 9.1 Exoneration by EEG -- 9.2 Unjust verdicts -- 9.3 Too unreliable? -- 9.4 Too dangerous? -- 9.5 Balancing and parity -- 9.6 Neuromarketing -- 9.7 Conclusion -- Part VI. Conclusion -- 10. Nuanced neuroethics -- 10.1 Back to Kevin's brain surgery -- 10.2 Avoid alarmism and neurohype -- 10.3 Approach evidence with vigilance -- 10.4 Recognize the complexity of human agency -- 10.5 Emphasize continuity over categories -- 10.6 Blend philosophy and neuroscience.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2023]