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economic integration in Europe and the United States
By building on a recent research comparing the EU and US and drawing on Riker's influential theory of federalism, this books explores the origins of fiscal unions. It investigates early American history and traces its constitutional debates to argue that an internal threat - such as sovereign debt crisis leading to social unrest threatening the Union - triggers emergence of federal taxing powers - i.e. a federal fiscal union. It then contrasts the American experience of fiscal integration with the European one and subsequently concludes with the insights for the EU. It is a first monograph to compare the American and European models of fiscal integration, making two original contributions to the theoretical and empirical literature. In reference to the former, it introduces the concept of fiscalization, which defines the emergence of a 'fiscal union' with federal tax powers. Concerning the latter, by analysing the Confederation period of the US and applying Riker's theory using mainly unexplored primary sources, such as the protocols from state ratification conventions of 1787/88, this book adds to the US-EU comparative federalism literature. It shows that paradoxically, by not agreeing to give the EU fiscal capacity, so that they could protect their fiscal sovereignty, member states gave up more of this very fiscal sovereignty to the central institutions, than states in classical federations. This research allows the reader to learn about the similarities - and the differences - between the pre-Constitution US and the modern EU with regards to their fiscal arrangements; a comparison of the arguments that were used while debating those arrangements; and finally - the conditions under which central level of government in the systems of multi-level government is likely to get a power to tax. --
Cover -- Titlepage -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Abbreviations -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 The problematic -- 1.2 Comparative federalism lens -- 1.3 Theory -- 1.4 Hypothesis -- 1.5 Research design -- 1.6 Contribution -- 2 Fiscalization of the US Federal Government -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 How did fiscalization of the US federal government emerge? -- 2.2.1 Historical background -- 2.2.2 The argument-fiscalization as the result of a threat -- 2.3 The positive consequences of the fiscalization of the federal government
2.3.1 Federal credit and the ability to borrow at low rates -- 2.3.2 A possibility to tackle future unpredictable exigencies: A Constitution written for centuries, not decades -- 2.3.3 States will contribute equally based on their wealth, and not on a direct exposure to a threat -- 2.3.4 Federal responsibilities will be matched with federal resources -- 2.3.5 The unlimited federal power to tax will paradoxically lead to lower tax rates -- 2.3.6 Unlimited power within a limited sphere -- 2.3.7 The federal government will be able to act directly on citizens
2.3.8 The fiscal needs of the states will diminish, as some of their responsibilities will be shifted to the federal level -- 2.3.9 Federal taxes will have a natural limit against excess -- 2.3.10 Fiscalization will lead to a more democratic government -- 2.4 Summary -- 3 The Debate over the Fiscalization of the US Federal Government -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The negative consequences of the requisition system -- 3.2.1 Plunder of the people and `atrophy' of the union, followed by its dissolution -- 3.2.2 States constantly negotiating the level of their contributions
3.2.3 The coercion of states to comply with federal fiscal directives (which is madness and leads to civil war) -- 3.3 The negative consequences of the fiscalization of the federal government -- 3.3.1 The states would be left with no money, since federal government would collect all the taxes -- 3.3.2 The federal government would use the money raised to oppress the people and repress their liberties -- 3.3.3 The `supreme law of the land' and the `proper and necessary' clauses give unlimited power to the federal government -- 3.3.4 It would involve expansion of the federal tax administration
3.3.5 It would increase the overall burden of taxation -- 3.3.6 It is against the principle `no taxation without representation' -- 3.4 Summary -- 4 Fiscal Regulation of the EU -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 How did the EU's fiscal regulation and quasi-fiscalization emerge? -- 4.2.1 Background -- 4.2.2 Fiscal regulation -- 4.2.3 Quasi-fiscalization -- 4.3 Summary -- 5 Explaining National Preferences on the Fiscalization of the EU -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The debate on the Five Presidents' Report: the main arguments in favour of and against fiscalization of the EU
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Fiscal unions : economic integration in Europe and the United States