The false promise of superiority : the United States and nuclear deterrence after the Cold War /
In focusing on US nuclear superiority, contemporary scholars highlight capability asymmetries, or improvements, that only promise to override undesirable deterrence constraints; and they accept too readily that coercive bargaining tactics can compensate, rather than worsen, conditions when capabilit...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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New York, NY :
Oxford University Press,
[2023]
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Connect to the full text of this electronic book |
| Summary: | In focusing on US nuclear superiority, contemporary scholars highlight capability asymmetries, or improvements, that only promise to override undesirable deterrence constraints; and they accept too readily that coercive bargaining tactics can compensate, rather than worsen, conditions when capability alone appears insufficient. In this, they understate the influence of assumptions about adversary intent--conjectures influenced by political, social, psychological, and organizational factors--that determine how parties act in a conflict, and whether they seek to avoid one. To compensate, The False Promise of Superiority reflects on deficiencies in US thinking about the Cold War nuclear balance to expose biases in current thinking about US nuclear superiority. It examines the exaggerated utility of coercive tactics, which include making commitments, manipulating risk, showing resolve, and establishing reputations for acting. It develops its points with revealing case studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Iran nuclear deal. It closes by discussing the implications for policy and analysis of a long list of perils and pitfalls identified in the volume.--provided by publisher. |
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| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (xii, 275 pages) : illustrations (black and white), |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| ISBN: | 9780197680803 0197680801 9780197680896 0197680895 |