http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
Bias seems to be everywhere. Biased media outlets decisively influence the political opinions and votes of millions of people. Discriminatory policies favor some racial groups over others. We tend to judge ourselves more favorably than our peers, and more favorably than the evidence warrants. But what is it, exactly, for a person or thing to be biased? In Bias: A Philosophical Study, Thomas Kelly explores a number of foundational questions about the nature of bias and our practices of attributing it. He develops a general framework for thinking about bias, the norm theoretic account, and shows how that framework illuminates much that we say and think about bias in both everyday life and the sciences. He argues provocatively that both morality and rationality sometimes require us to be biased; that groups of people can be biased even if none of their members are; that we are often rationally required to believe that those who disagree with us are biased, even if we know absolutely nothing about why they believe as they do or about their psychologies; and that whether someone counts as biased is often a relative matter. He defends the possibility of what he calls 'biased knowing' and argues that the phenomenon has significant implications for both philosophical methodology and scepticism. A central aim of the book is to expand the range of issues that have thus far been considered under the heading 'the philosophy of bias' by putting new theoretical questions on the table and proposing bold answers that can serve as starting points for future inquiry.
Introduction -- 1. A Familiar Phenomenon -- 2. The Philosophy of Bias: Expanding the Playing Field -- 3. Apology -- I . CONCEPTUAL FUNDAMENTALS -- 1. Diversity, Relativity, Etc. -- 1. Diversity -- 2. Relativity -- 3. Directionality -- 4. Bias about Bias -- 5. Biased Representation -- 6. Parts and Wholes -- 2. Pluralism and Priority -- 1. Explanatory Priority -- 2. Are People (Ever) the Fundamental Carriers of Bias? -- 3. Processes and Outcomes -- 4. Unbiased Outcomes from Biased Processes? -- 5. Biased Outcomes from Unbiased Processes? -- 6. Pluralism -- II. BIAS AND NORMS -- 3. The Norm-Theoretic Account of Bias -- 1. The Diversity of Norms -- 2. Disagreement -- 3. The Perspectival Character of Bias Attributions -- 4. When Norms Conflict -- 4. The Bias Blind Spot and the Biases of Introspection -- 1. The Introspection Illusion as a Source of the Bias Blind Spot -- 2. Why We're More Likely to See People as Biased When They Disagree with Us -- 3. Is It a Contingent Fact That Introspection is an Unreliable Way of Telling Whether You're Biased? -- 4. How the Perspectival Account Explains the Bias Blind Spot, as Well as the Biases of Introspection -- 5. Against "Naïve Realism", For Inevitability -- 5. Biased People -- 1. Biases as Dispositions -- 2. Bias as a Thick Evaluative Concept -- 3. Biased Believers, Biased Agents -- 4. Biased Agents, Unreliable Agents -- 5. Overcompensation -- 6. Norms of Objectivity -- 1. Some Varieties -- 2. Constitutive Norms of Objectivity -- 3. Following the Argument Wherever It Leads -- 7. Symmetry and Bias Attributions -- 1. Two Challenges -- 2. Norms without Bias? -- 3. Symmetry -- 4. Bias without Norms? -- 5. Pejorative vs. Non-Pejorative Attributions of Bias -- I I I . BIAS AND KNOWLEDGE -- 8. Bias and Knowledge -- 1. Biased Knowing -- 2. Can Biased Beliefs Be Knowledge? -- 3. Are Biases Essential to Knowing? -- 4. Knowledge and Symmetry -- 5. How and When Bias Excludes Knowledge: A Proposal -- 9. Knowledge, Skepticism, and Reliability -- 1. Biased Knowing and Philosophical Methodology -- 2. Are We Biased Against Skepticism? -- 3. Reliability and Contingency -- 4. A Tale of Three Thinkers -- 10. Bias Attributions and the Epistemology of Disagreement -- 1. On Attributing Bias to Those Who Disagree with Us -- 2. The Case for Skepticism -- 3. Against Skepticism -- 11. Main Themes and Conclusions -- 1. Five Themes -- 2. Conclusions
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge
Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2022