Authority, cooperation, and accountability /

"This book develops a novel strategy for addressing individual accountability in the context of cooperatively committed harms. For example, how should we decide a single employee's moral accountability in a corporation that commits egregious wrongs? What about a single soldier fighting in...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Bazargan-Forward, Saba (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2022.
Edition:First edition.
Subjects:
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Authority, Cooperation, and Accountability
  • Copyright
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Preface and Acknowledgments
  • Epigraph
  • Introduction
  • Olympic Sabotage
  • PART I: THEORY
  • 1: Divisions of Agential Labor
  • 1.1 Function and Authority in a Division of Agential Labor
  • 1.1.1 On Agentive Functions
  • 1.1.2 Authority in an Interpersonal Division of Agential Labor
  • 1.2 Autonomy in Divisions of Agential Labor
  • 1.3 Conclusion
  • 2: Authority-Based Accountability
  • Olympic Sabotage
  • 2.1 Argument for Authority-Based Accountability
  • 2.1.1 Whose Motivating Reasons?
  • Strategic Bomber
  • The Argument for Authority-Based Accountability
  • 2.1.2 Are Protected Reasons Necessary for Authority-Based Accountability?
  • 2.1.3 Implications for Executor Accountability
  • Performance Review
  • 2.1.4 Authority-Based Accountability in Groups
  • The Bandits and the Beans⁷
  • 2.1.5 Authority-Based Accountability Versus Ordinary Accountability
  • 2.2 Contrast with Other Views
  • 2.2.1 Abraham Roth
  • 2.2.2 Christopher Kutz
  • 2.3 Counterarguments and Arguments from Casuistry
  • 2.3.1 Deontic Relevance of Motivating Reasons
  • Trolley 1
  • Trolley 2
  • 2.3.2 Causally Inert Promises
  • Double Promise
  • 2.3.3 Consequentialist Reasons to Cooperate in Wrongdoing
  • Baker's Dozen
  • 2.3.4 Group-Size and Authority-Based Accountability
  • Conspiracy Choice
  • 2.4 Conclusion
  • Conference Hike
  • 3: Establishing a Division of Agential Labor
  • Drug Theft
  • 3.1 Promises
  • 3.1.1 Normative Power Views
  • 3.1.2 Conventionalism
  • 3.1.3 Expectationalism
  • 3.1.4 Immoral Promises
  • 3.2 Requests and Agreements
  • 3.2.1 Requests
  • 3.2.2 Agreements
  • 3.3 Commitments in Shared Action
  • 3.3.1 Margaret Gilbert
  • 3.3.2 Michael Bratman
  • 3.4 Conclusion
  • 4: Imperfect Divisions of Agential Labor
  • 4.1 Alienation
  • 4.1.1 Alienated Executors
  • Hired Emails
  • Nihilist Emails
  • 4.1.2 Alienated Deliberators
  • Protégé Emails
  • Benefactor
  • Concerted Harassment 1
  • 4.2 Coercion
  • 4.2.1 Coercion and Accountability in General
  • 4.2.2 Coerced Promises
  • Coercively Made Promises
  • Coerced Promise 1
  • Coerced Promise 2
  • Coerced Promise 3
  • Coercively Accepted Promises
  • Coerced Acceptance 1
  • Coerced Acceptance 2
  • Coerced Acceptance 3
  • 4.2.3 Coercion in Cooperatively Committed Harm
  • Bigots 1
  • Bigots 2
  • 4.3 Ignorance
  • 4.3.1 Ignorant Executors and Ignorant Deliberators
  • Ignorant Executor
  • Ignorant Deliberator
  • Variant 1a
  • Variant 1b
  • Variant 1c
  • Variant 1d
  • 4.3.2 Ignorance in Cooperatively Committed Harms
  • Ignorant Cooperative Action 1
  • Ignorant Cooperative Action 2
  • 4.4 Conclusion
  • Summary of Part I
  • PART II: APPLICATIONS
  • 5: War Ethics
  • 5.1 Revisionism and Authority-Based Accountability in War
  • 5.1.1 Revisionist Accounts of War Ethics
  • 5.1.2 Cooperatively Committed Harms in War
  • 5.1.3 Example of a Cooperatively Committed Harm in War
  • 5.1.4 Challenges