Authority, cooperation, and accountability /
"This book develops a novel strategy for addressing individual accountability in the context of cooperatively committed harms. For example, how should we decide a single employee's moral accountability in a corporation that commits egregious wrongs? What about a single soldier fighting in...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Oxford :
Oxford University Press,
2022.
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| Edition: | First edition. |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Connect to the full text of this electronic book |
Table of Contents:
- Cover
- Authority, Cooperation, and Accountability
- Copyright
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Epigraph
- Introduction
- Olympic Sabotage
- PART I: THEORY
- 1: Divisions of Agential Labor
- 1.1 Function and Authority in a Division of Agential Labor
- 1.1.1 On Agentive Functions
- 1.1.2 Authority in an Interpersonal Division of Agential Labor
- 1.2 Autonomy in Divisions of Agential Labor
- 1.3 Conclusion
- 2: Authority-Based Accountability
- Olympic Sabotage
- 2.1 Argument for Authority-Based Accountability
- 2.1.1 Whose Motivating Reasons?
- Strategic Bomber
- The Argument for Authority-Based Accountability
- 2.1.2 Are Protected Reasons Necessary for Authority-Based Accountability?
- 2.1.3 Implications for Executor Accountability
- Performance Review
- 2.1.4 Authority-Based Accountability in Groups
- The Bandits and the Beans⁷
- 2.1.5 Authority-Based Accountability Versus Ordinary Accountability
- 2.2 Contrast with Other Views
- 2.2.1 Abraham Roth
- 2.2.2 Christopher Kutz
- 2.3 Counterarguments and Arguments from Casuistry
- 2.3.1 Deontic Relevance of Motivating Reasons
- Trolley 1
- Trolley 2
- 2.3.2 Causally Inert Promises
- Double Promise
- 2.3.3 Consequentialist Reasons to Cooperate in Wrongdoing
- Baker's Dozen
- 2.3.4 Group-Size and Authority-Based Accountability
- Conspiracy Choice
- 2.4 Conclusion
- Conference Hike
- 3: Establishing a Division of Agential Labor
- Drug Theft
- 3.1 Promises
- 3.1.1 Normative Power Views
- 3.1.2 Conventionalism
- 3.1.3 Expectationalism
- 3.1.4 Immoral Promises
- 3.2 Requests and Agreements
- 3.2.1 Requests
- 3.2.2 Agreements
- 3.3 Commitments in Shared Action
- 3.3.1 Margaret Gilbert
- 3.3.2 Michael Bratman
- 3.4 Conclusion
- 4: Imperfect Divisions of Agential Labor
- 4.1 Alienation
- 4.1.1 Alienated Executors
- Hired Emails
- Nihilist Emails
- 4.1.2 Alienated Deliberators
- Protégé Emails
- Benefactor
- Concerted Harassment 1
- 4.2 Coercion
- 4.2.1 Coercion and Accountability in General
- 4.2.2 Coerced Promises
- Coercively Made Promises
- Coerced Promise 1
- Coerced Promise 2
- Coerced Promise 3
- Coercively Accepted Promises
- Coerced Acceptance 1
- Coerced Acceptance 2
- Coerced Acceptance 3
- 4.2.3 Coercion in Cooperatively Committed Harm
- Bigots 1
- Bigots 2
- 4.3 Ignorance
- 4.3.1 Ignorant Executors and Ignorant Deliberators
- Ignorant Executor
- Ignorant Deliberator
- Variant 1a
- Variant 1b
- Variant 1c
- Variant 1d
- 4.3.2 Ignorance in Cooperatively Committed Harms
- Ignorant Cooperative Action 1
- Ignorant Cooperative Action 2
- 4.4 Conclusion
- Summary of Part I
- PART II: APPLICATIONS
- 5: War Ethics
- 5.1 Revisionism and Authority-Based Accountability in War
- 5.1.1 Revisionist Accounts of War Ethics
- 5.1.2 Cooperatively Committed Harms in War
- 5.1.3 Example of a Cooperatively Committed Harm in War
- 5.1.4 Challenges