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Normative pluralism : resolving conflicts between moral and prudential reasons /

The potential conflicts between morality and self-interest lies at the heart of ethics. However, moral philosophers sometimes think of their task as trying to gain knowledge simply of what we are morally required to do, leaving aside the larger normative question of what we ought to do all things co...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Sagdahl, Mathea Slåttholm (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2022]
Subjects:
Normativity (Ethics)
Pluralism.
Norme (Morale)
Pluralisme (Philosophie)
pluralism.
Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
PHILOSOPHY.
Pluralism
Electronic books.
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Half-Title
  • Series
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • Preface
  • 1. Introduction
  • 1.1. What We Ought to Do
  • 1.2. Topic, Scope, and Aims
  • 1.3. Normative Pluralism and Value Pluralism: Separate Topics
  • 1.4. Procedure
  • 2. Structures of Normativity and the Concept of "Ought"
  • 2.1. Introduction
  • 2.2. Morality and Prudence as Normative Sources
  • 2.3. A Non-.Relational View: Morality and Prudence as Competing Theories of Ought
  • 2.4. Normative Pluralism and Incommensurable Oughts
  • 2.4.1. Incommensurability as Noncomparability
  • 2.5. Qualified Oughts as Genuine Oughts
  • 2.6. The Unqualified Ought
  • 2.6.1. Comprehensiveness
  • 2.6.2. Supremacy
  • 2.7. The Meaning of "Ought All Things Considered" and "Just Plain Ought"
  • 2.7.1. Reasons and "Most Reason"
  • 2.7.2. Permissibility and Silence
  • 3. The Grounding and Extent of Normative Pluralism
  • 3.1. Introduction
  • 3.2. A Teleological Grounding
  • 3.3. Deflationary Normative Pluralism
  • 3.4. Grounding a Reasonable Set of Normative Standpoints
  • 3.4.1. Top-.Down versus Bottom-.Up Approach to Normativity
  • 3.4.2. Derivative and Fundamental Normativity
  • 3.5. Sidgwick and the Dualism of Practical Reason
  • 3.5.1. The Dualism as Normative Pluralism
  • 3.5.2. The Grounding of the Dualism
  • 3.6. A Kantian Approach?
  • 3.7. The Dualism of Practical Reason and Reasons of Meaningfulness
  • 3.8. Summary and Conclusion
  • 4. Incommensurability, Rationality, and Choice
  • 4.1. Introduction
  • 4.2. Normative Monism and Practical Rationality
  • 4.3. Normative Pluralism and Practical Rationality
  • 4.4. Rationality and Incommensurable Options
  • 4.5. Choice and Intelligibility
  • 4.6. Incommensurable Options and Stable Intentions
  • 4.7. Human Agency with and without Incommensurability
  • 4.8. Summary
  • 5. The Argument from Nominal-.Notable Comparisons
  • 5.1. Introduction
  • 5.2. The Structure of the Argument
  • 5.3. The Possibility of Nominal-.Notable Conflicts
  • 5.4. The Dialectical Situation
  • 5.5. Ways to Debunk the Central Intuition of the Argument
  • 5.6. Biting the Bullet
  • 5.7. A Test of Commensurability and an Argument against Monism
  • 5.8. Two Alternative Variants of the Argument from Nominal-.Notable Comparisons
  • 5.9. The Concurrence Argument
  • 6. The Supremacy Challenge
  • 6.1. The Codification Challenge and the Supremacy Challenge
  • 6.2. The Incoherence Argument against Supremacy
  • 6.3. Rationality and the Nature of the Overarching Normative Standpoint
  • 6.3.1. The Overarching Normative Standpoint as Rationality
  • 6.3.2. Two Meanings of "Rational"
  • 6.3.3. Different Conceptions of Rationality as the Overarching Normative Standpoint
  • 6.3.4. The Relevance of "Rational" Criticism as an Indicator of Ought Simpliciter
  • 6.4. The Overarching Normative Standpoint and the Overridingness of Morality
  • 6.4.1. Monism with Moral Overridingness Compared with Normative Pluralism