Cover Image

Pragmatist quietism : a meta-ethical system /

Show other versions (1)

"Pragmatist Quietism argues that there are objective ethical truths that neither require nor admit of a vindication or foundation from domains outside of ethics--metaphysics, semantics, epistemology, and so on. First, it argues that normative-ethical debates are similar in important ways to deb...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Sepielli, Andrew (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2022.
Edition:First edition.
Subjects:
Ethics.
Pragmatism.
Morale.
Pragmatisme.
ethics (philosophy)
pragmatism.
Epistemology.
PHILOSOPHY.
Ethics
Pragmatism
Electronic books.
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Pragmatist Quietism: A Meta-Ethical System
  • Copyright
  • Acknowledgements
  • Contents
  • 1: Introduction
  • 1. An Outline of My View
  • 2. A Chapter-by-Chapter Overview
  • 2: Raw Materials
  • 1. Deep and Superficial Inquiry and Debate
  • 1. Explanation and Illustration
  • 2. A Canonical Statement
  • 3. Superficial/Deep vs Internal/External
  • 2. The Special Features of Ethical Thought
  • 3: Why Does There Seem to Be a 'Problem with Ethics'?
  • 1. Why Seemingly Superficial Inquiry and Debate Seem Not to Be Objective
  • 1. On 'Object-Placing'
  • 2. On 'Cognition-Commanding'
  • 2. Why the Foregoing Doesn't Generally Suggest a 'Problem' for Non-Ethical Domains
  • 3. Why the Foregoing Does Suggest a 'Problem with Ethics'
  • 4. Why Deep Ethical Debates Don't Seem to Save Ethical Objectivity
  • 5. Superficial Ethical Debates, Revisited
  • 6. Concerns about My Explanation: Philosophers and the Folk
  • 4: Objectivist Quietism about Ethics, Part One: The Positive View
  • 1. Why I'm Talking about Value Rather than Substantivity and Truth
  • 2. The 'Truthy' Values
  • 3. Why No Truthy Values Are at Stake in Superficial Ethical Debates
  • 4. The 'Specifically Ethical' Values
  • 5. How This Supports Quietism
  • 6. Right Answers in Ethics
  • 7. In Defence of Objectivist Quietism
  • 1. Intuitions about Cases
  • 2. Seeing Others in the Right Way
  • 3. Epistemology
  • 4. Evaluative Connections
  • 5: Objectivist Quietism about Ethics, Part Two: Objections and Responses
  • 1. What If Metaphysics, Semantics, Etc. Matter by Definition?
  • 2. Why Assess Beliefs . . . in This Way?
  • 3. Ethics in Deep Contexts
  • 4. Divorcing Ethical Values from Truthy Values
  • 5. Begging the Question
  • 6: Pragmatism
  • 1. Pragmatism What
  • 1. Pragmatism vs Representationalism
  • 2. Making Pragmatism Explanatory
  • 2. Why Be a Pragmatist?
  • 3. An Autonomous Evaluative Sphere?
  • 7: Digging Deeper
  • 1. Representationality, Right Answers, and the Importance of Explanation
  • 2. What If I'm Wrong?
  • 8: Moral Epistemology
  • 1. Implications for Ethical Inquiry
  • 1. Quietism and Foundationalism in Ethics
  • 2. Meaning-Based Distortion
  • 3. Metaphysical Arguments
  • 4. Arguments from the Marks of Truth
  • 5. Arguments from Rational Commitment
  • 6. Indeterminate Anti-Quietist Arguments
  • 7. Lessons for Moral Epistemology
  • 2. Dealing with Disagreement
  • 3. Debunking Arguments
  • 1. Debunking Arguments and Explanation
  • 2. How We Should Resist This Demand for Explanation
  • 9: Pragmatist Quietism vs Expressivism
  • 1. A Difference in Explanatory Framework
  • 2. A Difference in Order of Inquiry
  • 3. Both Differences Together: Meta-Semantics
  • 10: Quietism and Counter-Normativity
  • 1. The Counter-Reasons/Schmeasons Argument
  • 2. The First Possibility: 'Reasons' and 'Schmeasons' Are Equally Thin, and Both Are Completely Thin
  • 3. The Second Possibility: 'Reasons' Is Thinner than 'Schmeasons' Is
  • 4. The Third Possibility: 'Reason' and 'Schmeason' Are Equally Thin, but Neither Is Completely Thin