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Epistemic risk and the demands of rationality /

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How much does rationality constrain what we should believe on the basis of our evidence? Richard Pettigrew provides a novel philosophical argument for permissivism about epistemic rationality, and explores a variety of applications, including a discussion of conspiracy theories and the morality of i...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Pettigrew, Richard (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2022.
Edition:First edition.
Subjects:
Knowledge, Theory of.
Rationalism.
Théorie de la connaissance.
Rationalisme.
epistemology.
rationalism (philosophy)
PHILOSOPHY.
Knowledge, Theory of
Rationalism
Electronic books.
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Abstract
  • Acknowledgements
  • 1. Introduction
  • I. A permissive theory of epistemic raionality
  • 2. Varieties of Permissivism
  • 2.1 What Sort of Doxastic State?
  • 2.2 Interpersonal or Intrapersonal?
  • 2.3 Radical or Not?
  • 2.4 Common or Rare?
  • 2.5 My Brand of Permissivism
  • 3. Epistemic Risk and Epistemic Utility for Beliefs
  • 4. Epistemic Risk and Epistemic Utility for Credences
  • 4.1 Measuring the Epistemic Utility of an Individual Credence
  • 4.2 Measuring the Epistemic Utility of an Entire Credal State
  • 4.3 Why Should Our Measures Be Strictly Proper?
  • 5. Foundational Results in Epistemic Utility Theory
  • 5.1 Probabilism
  • 5.2 The Principal Principle
  • 5.3 Plan Conditionalization
  • 6. Epistemic Risk and Picking Priors I: The Decision Rule
  • 6.1 Risk-Sensitive Decision-Making Under Risk
  • 6.1.1 Expected Utility Theory and the Diminishing Marginal Utility of Money
  • 6.1.2 Risk-Weighted Expected Utility and the Allais Preferences
  • 6.2 Risk-Sensitive Decision-Making Under Uncertainty
  • 6.2.1 Subjective Bayesianism
  • 6.2.2 Objective Bayesianism
  • 6.2.3 Risk-Weighted Subjective Bayesianism
  • 6.2.4 Risk-Weighted Objective Bayesianism
  • 6.2.5 Wald's Maximin Rule
  • 6.2.6 Hurwicz's Criterion of Realism
  • 6.2.7 The Generalized Hurwicz Criterion
  • 6.3 Characterizing Our Rules
  • 6.3.1 The Axioms
  • 6.3.2 The Representation Theorems
  • 6.4 Appendix: Proofs
  • 6.4.1 A Useful Lemma
  • 6.4.2 Proof of Theorem 7(i): Characterizing Subjective Bayesianism
  • 6.4.3 Proof of Theorem 7(ii): Characterizing Objective Bayesianism
  • 6.4.4 Proof of Theorem 7(iii): Characterizing Subjective Risk-Weighted Bayesianism
  • 6.4.5 Proof of Theorem 7(iv): Characterizing Objective Risk-Weighted Bayesianism
  • 6.4.6 Proof of Theorem 7(vi): Characterizing the Hurwicz Criterion
  • 6.4.7 Proof of Theorem 7(v): Characterizing Minimax
  • 6.4.8 Proofs of Theorems 7(vii): Characterizing the Generalized Hurwicz Criterion
  • 7. Epistemic Risk and Picking Priors II: The Consequences of the Rule
  • 7.1 Decomposing Options into Their Component Parts
  • 7.2 The Credal Consequences of the Rules
  • 7.2.1 The Credal Consequences of the Other Rules
  • 7.2.2 The Credal Consequences of GHC
  • 7.3 Appendix: Proofs
  • 7.3.1 Proof of Theorem 9
  • 8. Epistemic Risk and Picking Posteriors
  • 8.1 GHC Forever
  • 8.2 Priors and Plans Together
  • 8.3 Using Priors to Pick Posteriors
  • 8.4 Tying Up Loose Ends
  • 8.4.1 Maximizing Expected Epistemic Utility from Whose Point of View?
  • 8.4.2 In Favour of Maximizing Expected Utility
  • 8.5 Appendix: Proofs
  • II. Putting the theory to work
  • 9. What Is the Value of Rationality?
  • 9.1 The Value of Rationality
  • 9.2 Deferring to Rationality
  • 9.2.1 Levinstein's Deference Argument Against Permissivism
  • 9.2.2 Greco and Hedden on the Concept of Rationality
  • 9.3 Life on the Edge of Rationality
  • 10. Is Brute Shuffling Irrational?
  • 11. Priors that Allow You to Learn Inductively
  • 12. Clifford's Shipowner, Conspiracy Theories, and Choosing with and for Others
  • 12.1 Choosing for Others
  • 12.2 Choosing with Others
  • 13. Summing Up
  • References
  • Index.