Fundamentals of Bayesian epistemology. 2, Arguments, challenges, alternatives /

"This book introduces readers to the fundamentals of Bayesian epistemology. It begins by motivating and explaining the idea of a degree of belief (also known as a “credence”). It then presents Bayesians' five core normative rules governing degrees of belief: Kolmogorov's three probabi...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Titelbaum, Michael G. (Author)
Format:	eBook
Language:	English
Published:	Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2022.
Edition:	First edition.
Subjects:	Bayesian statistical decision theory. Knowledge, Theory of. Belief and doubt. Probabilities. Théorie de la décision bayésienne. Théorie de la connaissance. Croyance et doute. Probabilités. epistemology. probability. Bayesian statistical decision theory Belief and doubt Knowledge, Theory of Probabilities Electronic books.
Online Access:	Connect to the full text of this electronic book

Table of Contents:

Cover
Fundamentals of Bayesian Epistemology 2: Arguments, Challenges, Alternatives
Copyright
Contents
Quick Reference
PART III: APPLICATIONS
6: Confirmation
6.1 Formal features of the confirmation relation
6.1.1 Confirmation is weird! The Paradox of the Ravens
6.1.2 Further adequacy conditions
6.2 Carnap's theory of confirmation
6.2.1 Confirmation as relevance
6.2.2 Finding the right function
6.3 Grue
6.4 Subjective Bayesian confirmation
6.4.1 Confirmation measures
6.4.2 Subjective Bayesian solutions to the Paradox of the Ravens
6.5 Exercises
6.6 Further reading
Notes
7: Decision Theory
7.1 Calculating expectations
7.1.1 The move to utility
7.2 Expected utility theory
7.2.1 Preference rankings and money pumps
7.2.2 Savage's expected utility
7.2.3 Jeffrey's theory
7.2.4 Risk aversion and Allais' Paradox
7.3 Causal Decision Theory
7.3.1 Newcomb's Problem
7.3.2 A causal approach
7.3.3 Responses and extensions
7.4 Exercises
7.5 Further reading
Notes
Further Reading
PART IV: ARGUMENTS FOR BAYESIANISM
8: Representation Theorems
8.1 Ramsey's four-step process
8.2 Savage's representation theorem
8.3 Representation theorems and probabilism
8.3.1 Objections to the argument
8.3.2 Reformulating the argument
8.4 Exercises
8.5 Further reading
Notes
9: Dutch Book Arguments
9.1 Dutch Books
9.1.1 Dutch Books for probabilism
9.1.2 Further Dutch Books
9.2 The Dutch Book Argument
9.2.1 Dutch Books depragmatized
9.3 Objections to Dutch Book Arguments
9.3.1 The Package Principle
9.3.2 Dutch Strategy objections
9.4 Exercises
9.5 Further reading
Notes
10: Accuracy Arguments
10.1 Accuracy as calibration
10.2 The gradational accuracy argument for probabilism
10.2.1 The Brier score.
10.2.2 Joyce's accuracy argument for probabilism
10.3 Objections to the accuracy argument for probabilism
10.3.1 The absolute-value score
10.3.2 Proper scoring rules
10.3.3 Are improper rules unacceptable?
10.4 Do we really need Finite Additivity?
10.5 An accuracy argument for Conditionalization
10.6 Exercises
10.7 Further reading
Notes
Further Reading
PART V: CHALLENGES AND OBJECTIONS
11: Memory Loss and Self-locating Credences
11.1 Memory loss
11.1.1 The problem
11.1.2 A possible solution
11.1.3 Suppositional Consistency
11.2 Self-locating credences
11.2.1 The problem
11.2.2 The HTM approach
11.2.3 Going forward
11.3 Exercises
11.4 Further reading
Notes
12: Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience
12.1 Old evidence
12.1.1 The problem
12.1.2 Solutions to the diachronic problem
12.1.3 Solutions to the synchronic problem
12.1.4 More radical solutions
12.2 Logical omniscience
12.2.1 Clutter avoidance and partial distributions
12.2.2 Logical confirmation and logical learning
12.2.3 Allowing logical uncertainty
12.2.4 Logical omniscience reconsidered
12.3 Exercises
12.4 Further reading
Notes
13: The Problem of the Priors and Alternatives to Bayesianism
13.1 The Problem of the Priors
13.1.1 Understanding the problem
13.1.2 Washing out of priors
13.2 Frequentism
13.2.1 Significance testing
13.2.2 Troubles with significance testing
13.3 Likelihoodism
13.3.1 Troubles with likelihoodism
13.4 Exercises
13.5 Further reading
Notes
14: Comparative Confidence, Ranged Credences, and Dempster-Shafer Theory
14.1 Comparative confidence
14.1.1 de Finetti's comparative conditions
14.1.2 The Scott Axiom
14.1.3 Extensions and challenges
14.2 Ranged credences
14.2.1 Ranged credences, representation, and evidence.
14.2.2 Extensions and challenges
14.3 Dempster-Shafer theory
14.4 Exercises
14.5 Further reading
Notes
Glossary for Volumes 1 &amp
2
Bibliography of Volumes 1 &amp
2
Index of Names in Volumes 1 &amp
2.