rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Belief, agency, and knowledge
    sub title: essays on epistemic normativity
  name:
    name part: Chrisman, Matthew
    role:
      role term: creator
    role:
      role term: author.
  type of resource: text
  genre: bibliography
  genre: Electronic books.
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: enk
    date issued: 2022
    copyright date: 2022
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: remote
    extent: 1 online resource
  abstract: "Epistemology is not just about the nature of knowledge or the analysis of concepts such as ‘knows' and ‘justified', it's also about what we ought to believe and how we should investigate and reason about what is the case. This is a book focused on these normative aspects of epistemology. More specifically, it is concerned with the nature of epistemic norms and the relation these have to the value of knowledge and the structure of doxastic agency. The first part develops a theory of doxastic agency according to which believers exercise agency with respect to their beliefs primarily in the always ongoing activity of maintaining systems of belief. The second part develops an account of the grip epistemic norms have on us and the nature of our epistemic values, which explains these in terms of the way a state, such as a person's belief, can be subject to robust “state norms” and valued accordingly for its stability within the practices constitutive of epistemic communities. The third part proposes inferentialist foundations for a meta-epistemological theory of epistemic discourse that takes seriously the idea that knowledge attributions are partly normative and hence should be partly classified on the ‘ought' side of the division between claims about what reality is like and claims about what people ought to do, think, and feel"--Publisher's description.
  table of contents: 1. Introduction -- PART I. DOXASTIC AGENCY -- 2. Belief are states not performances -- 3. Belief formation doesn't exhaust doxastic agency -- 4. The activity of maintaining beliefs -- PART II. EPISTEMIC NORMS -- 5. The aim of belief and the goal of truth -- Doxastic involuntarism and 'Ought to Believe' -- 7. Social foundations for epistemic normativity -- PART III. EPISTEMIC DISCOURSE -- 8. From epistemic contextualism to epistemic expressivism -- 9. From epistemic expressivism to epistemic inferentialism.
  note: Matthew Chrisman.
  note: Includes bibliographical references and index.
  subject:
    topic: Belief and doubt
  subject:
    topic: Virtue epistemology
  subject:
    topic: Croyance et doute
  subject:
    topic: Épistémologie de la vertu
  subject:
    topic: PHILOSOPHY
  subject:
    topic: Political
  subject:
    topic: Belief and doubt
  subject:
    topic: Virtue epistemology
  classification: BD215 .C47 2022
  classification: 121.6
  related item:
    title info:
      title: Belief, agency and knowledge
    name:
      name part: Chrisman, Matthew.
    origin info:
      publisher: Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2022
    identifier: (OCoLC)1292591049
  identifier: 9780192654205
  identifier: 0192654209
  identifier: 9780191925399
  identifier: 019192539X
  identifier: 9780192898852
  identifier: http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login
  record info:
    record content source: N$T
    record creation date: 220621
    record change date: 20260318164334.4
    record identifier: in00005697183
    language of cataloging:
      language term: eng