One true logic : a monist manifesto /

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Griffiths, Owen (Lecturer in philosophy) (Author), Paseau, Alexander (Author)
Format:	eBook
Language:	English
Published:	Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2022.
Edition:	First edition.
Subjects:	Logic. Monism. Monisme. History & Philosophy. MATHEMATICS. PHILOSOPHY. Language. Logic Monism Electronic books.
Online Access:	Connect to the full text of this electronic book

Table of Contents:

Introduction
Prologue
Part I. Monism vs. Pluralism
1. Conceptions of Logical Consequence
1.1 Tarski on logical consequence
1.2 Accounts of logical consequence
1.3 Philonian consequence
1.4 The necessity of logic
1.5 The formality of logic
1.6 'The intuitive concept of consequence'
2. What Is Monism?
2.1 Defining monism-a first pass
2.1.1 A scheme
2.1.2 Admissible formalizations
2.1.3 Admissible logics
2.1.4 A true logic
2.1.5 The one true logic
2.2 Epistemics
Appendix: the least true logic
3. Against Pluralism
3.1 Extensionally divergent formalizations
3.2 Horses for courses: languages and domains
3.2.1 Horses for courses: interlinguistic
3.2.2 Horses for courses: intralinguistic
3.3 Pluralism proper
3.3.1 Beall and Restall's modest pluralism
3.3.2 Shapiro's eclectic pluralism
3.4 Beall and Restall's modest pluralism
3.4.1 The 'settled core' of consequence
3.5 Shapiro's eclectic pluralism
3.5.1 SIA as a test case for pluralism
3.6 Metalogical reasoning
3.7 Logical nihilism
3.8 A problem for logical pluralism
3.8.1 All true logics
3.8.2 The single correct metalogic
3.8.3 Some arbitrary true logic
3.8.4 Each true logic
3.8.5 Summary
3.9 Two further issues
3.9.1 Non-deductive reasoning
3.9.2 A problem for monism?
3.10 Conclusion
Appendix: metalogical meaning variance
PART II. The logos hypothesis
4. The Lâ#x88;#x9E;Gâ#x88;#x9E;S Hypothesis
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Type and sort
4.3 The Lâ#x88;#x9E;Gâ#x88;#x9E;S Hypothesis
4.4 Back to origins
4.5 Top-down and bottom-up arguments
4.6 Pure FTTâ#x88;#x9E;â#x88;#x9E; defined
4.7 Semantics for pure FTTâ#x88;#x9E;â#x88;#x9E;
4.8 What are the formulas of pure FTTâ#x88;#x9E;â#x88;#x9E;?
5. Beyond the Finitary
5.1 Generalized quantifiers
5.2 The concurrence argument for FOL
5.3 Beyond FOL: 'there are infinitely many'
5.3.1 The finitude objection
5.3.2 The mathematical validity objection
5.3.3 The finite-description objection
5.3.4 The indeterminacy objection
5.3.5 Diagnosis
5.4 Generalization: 'there are Ì§Â#x9D;Å#x93;... many'
5.5 Beyond SOL: infinitary conjunction
5.5.1 Superhumans
5.5.2 Generalization
5.6 Beyond SOL: cardinality quantifiers
5.7 Conclusion
Appendix: technical results
6. Isomorphism Invariance
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Form as schematic
6.2.1 MacFarlane on formality
6.2.2 Form as normative
6.2.3 Form as topic-neutral
6.2.4 Form as abstraction
6.4 A necessary condition on OTL
6.5 Miscellaneous comments
6.6 McGee's Theorem
6.6.1 Isomorphism invariance
6.6.2 Relations
6.6.3 Caveats
6.6.4 Isomorphism-invariant relations
7. Towards the One True Logic
7.1 The logic's type
7.2 Theory of models
7.3 Mathematical consequences?
Appendix: the generalized quantifier 'most'
PART III. OBJECTIONS
8. The Heterogeneity Objection
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Uniform-isomorphism invariance
8.3 Feferman's invariantism
8.4 Bonnay's invariantism
8.5 Conclusion
9. The Overgeneration Objection
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Sensitivity
9.3 CH is logically true
9.4 CH is determinate
9.5 CH is epistemically determined
9.6 CH and neutrality
9.6.1 Dialectical neutrality
9.6.2 Informational neutrality
9.7 CH is logically expressible
9.8 Identity
9.9 Conclusion
Appendix: logical notions
10. The Absoluteness Objection
10.1 The absoluteness objection
10.2 Meaning-theoretic motivations
10.3 Anti-realist motivations
10.4 Independence motivations
10.5 Conclusion
11. The Intensional Objection
11.1 Unicorn negation
11.2 Modal responses
11.3 Biting the bullet
11.4 An open question
11.5 Conclusion
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index.