http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
Developing original accounts of the many aspects of belief, 'On Believing' puts the believer at the heart of the story. Developing a novel account of the normativity of belief, Hunter argues that the ethics of belief concern how a believer ought to be positioned in a world of possibilities.
Cover -- On Believing Being Right in a World of Possibilities -- Copyright -- Dededication -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1: On the Nature of Believing -- 1.1 A Deliberative Position -- 1.2 Possibilities, Facts, and Reasons -- 1.3 Acting in the Light of a Possibility -- 1.4 Effects, Manifestations, and Exercises -- 1.5 Belief States Are Not Causes -- 1.6 Belief Properties Are Not Causal Qualities -- 1.7 Non-Human Belief and Naturalism -- 2: The Ontology of Believing -- 2.1 Propositions, Possibilities, Belief States, and Belief Properties
2.2 Belief Properties, Sortals, and Qualities -- 2.3 Belief States and Realizers -- 2.4 Believing Is Not an Action or Activity -- 2.5 Believing Is Not a Relation -- 2.6 Believing and Understanding -- 3: The Objects of Believing -- 3.1 Individuating Belief Properties -- 3.2 Pure Cases and the Modal View of Belief -- 3.3 Certainty, Probability, and Agnosticism -- 3.4 Speech Acts and Aboutness -- 3.5 Knowledge, Inquiry, and Action -- 3.6 Making the Propositional View Fit -- 3.7 A History of Neglect -- 3.8 Representation without Propositions -- 4: Believing without Representing
4.1 Believing and Truth -- 4.2 Belief Properties and States Are Neither True Nor False -- 4.3 Tokens, Types, and Confusing Nominals -- 4.4 Beliefs and Realizers -- 4.5 Derivative Truth -- 4.6 On Wanting -- 5: Objectivity and Credal Illusions -- 5.1 Objectivity and Credal Illusions -- 5.2 Unbelievable Possibilities -- 5.3 Future Possibilities -- 5.4 Mere Possibilities -- 5.5 Denying Objectivity -- 5.6 Objectivity and the Inevitability of Credal Illusions -- 6: Subjectivity and Credal Necessities -- 6.1 The BB Principle -- 6.2 BB and the Center of a Conception -- 6.3 Being in Position
6.4 Credal Necessities and Transparency -- 6.5 Subjectivity, Force, and Content -- 6.6 Subjective Uncertainty -- 6.7 Rational Action -- 7: Credal Agency -- 7.1 Inference as a Mental Act -- 7.2 Inference Is Not an Onset of Believing -- 7.3 Inference Is Acting on Oneself -- 7.4 The Ontology of Inference -- 7.5 Inferring in Light of a Possibility -- 7.6 Inference Is Not Intentional -- 7.7 Inference Is Voluntary -- 7.8 Inference and Deduction -- 7.9 Unwilling Inference -- 8: Credal Norms -- 8.1 Believing and Attributive Goodness -- 8.2 Truth and Epistemic Value -- 8.3 Credal Credit
8.4 Belief Directives and Knowledge -- 8.5 Belief Directives and Evidence -- 8.6 Credal Blame -- Appendix: Fragmented Believing -- Bibliography -- Index
Includes bibliographical references and index.