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Essays on speech acts and other topics in pragmatics
"The author of the Essays that are republished here has worked on speech acts and other topics in pragmatics taking as her point of departure John L. Austin's philosophy of language. The main focus of the volume is on illocution, including issues such as illocutionary act classification, the role of the hearer's uptake and the interlocutor's responses, the accommodation of speaker-related preconditions, and the relationship of illocution with knowledge and power. Austin's way of distinguishing classes of illocutionary acts is defended and is shown to be useful in the analysis of discourse and conversation. The illocutionary act is described as bringing about effects on the deontic aspects of the relationship among the participants: such effects are defeasible, and conventional too, since their coming into being depends on the participants' agreement. This agreement, in many informal situations at least, is made manifest by the response of the addressee or other participant to the speaker's utterance and may be implicitly negotiated in conversation. Particular attention is paid to Verdictives and Exercitives. The collection also touches upon presupposition (considered in its communicative and persuasive functions), implicature and other aspects of Paul Grice's philosophy, and philosophical approaches to gender issues, always in the light of the author's view of speech as action"--Publisher's description.
Intro -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- 1. The Approach -- 2. The Essays -- 3. Some Background -- 4. Where All This Is Heading To -- 1. On Illocutionary Types -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Austin's Classification of Illocutionary Acts -- 3. Four Illocutionary Types -- 4. Some Speech-Act Theoretical Games -- 2. Speech Acts, Effects, and Responses -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Uptake and Response -- 3. Uptake and Perlocution -- 4. Uptake and Allegedly "Conditional" Illocutionary Acts -- 5. Two Kinds of Inappropriate Response
6. From Inappropriateness to Shifts in Illocutionary Force -- 7. What Happens in an Adjacency Pair -- 8. Speech Acts in Conversation -- 3. Ideology and the Persuasive Use of Presupposition -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Informative and Persuasive Uses of Presupposition in the Italian Daily Press -- 3. Some Doubts about the Received Account of Pragmatic Presupposition -- 4. Toward an Account of the Persuasive Use of Presupposition -- 5. Presupposition and Ideology -- 4. Intentions from the Other Side -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Analysis of Non-natural Meaning -- 3. The Cooperative Principle
4. The Notion of a Person -- 5. Presupposition, Implicature, and Context in Text Understanding -- 1. Two Perspectives on Text Understanding -- 2. On Text and Context -- 3. The Dynamic Relation between Text and Context -- 4. Assertion -- 5. Implicature -- 6. Presupposition -- 7. The Distinction between Presupposition and Implicature -- 8. Concluding Remarks -- 6. Illocutionary Force and Degrees of Strength in Language Use -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Why a Unified Account of Mitigation/Reinforcement and Illocutionary Force Is Desirable
3. Conditions for a Unified Account of Illocutionary Force and Mitigation/Reinforcement Phenomena -- 4. Cases of Mitigation and Reinforcement -- 5. Concluding Remarks -- 7. Speech Acts in Context -- 1. Context in the Received Speech Act Theory -- 2. What Should the Context of a Speech Act Be Like? -- 3. Some Alleged Incompatibilities -- 4. Speech Acts and Context Change -- 5. Concluding Remarks -- 8. Cognition and Narrativity in Speech Act Sequences -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Speech Act Sequencing and the Production of Effects -- 3. The Dynamics of Speech Act Sequences
4. The Role of Narrativity in Speech Act Sequencing -- 5. The Narrative Schema and the Understanding of Insisting -- 6. Some Conclusions -- 9. Two Conceptions of Rationality in Grice's Theory of Implicature -- 1. Implicature -- 2. Is Implicature Rational? -- 3. Grice on the Rationality of Conversational Implicature -- 4. The Nature of the Calculability Requirement -- 5. Two Ideas of Rationality -- 6. Concluding Remarks -- 10. How to Read Austin -- 1. Four Assumptions to Be Disputed -- 2. In Pursuit of Performatives? -- 3. Illocutionary Acts and Their Effects -- 4. What Is a Perlocutionary Act?
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2023]