Two arguments for the identity of indiscernibles /
"The goal of this book is to give two arguments for the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, the thesis that, necessarily, no two (concrete) objects differ solo numero-i.e., necessarily, no two objects differ only numerically. This is the weakest version of the Principle of Identity of Indi...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Oxford, United Kingdom ; New York, NY :
Oxford University Press,
2022.
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| Edition: | First edition. |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Connect to the full text of this electronic book |
| Summary: | "The goal of this book is to give two arguments for the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, the thesis that, necessarily, no two (concrete) objects differ solo numero-i.e., necessarily, no two objects differ only numerically. This is the weakest version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. The book argues that there is no trivial version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, since what is usually known as the trivial version of the principle is consistent with objects differing only numerically. One argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles is based on Humean considerations excluding a certain kind of necessary connection between distinct objects, and the other is based on ideas about what grounds the having of certain properties by objects. There are more restricted versions of the Identity of Indiscernibles, which state that, necessarily, no two objects can be purely qualitatively indiscernible or intrinsically purely qualitatively indiscernible. Two new arguments are presented against these versions of the principle. Thus the book contains four new arguments about the Identity of Indiscernibles: two for the weakest version of the principle, and two against two stronger versions of the principle. It is also argued that one of the former two arguments can be extended to apply to abstract objects. The book concludes that, necessarily, there are no objects, whether abstract or concrete, that differ only numerically-equivalently: necessarily, there are no objects that share all their non-trivializing properties. The book also contains an extended discussion of trivializing and non-trivializing properties"-- |
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| Physical Description: | 1 online resource |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| ISBN: | 0191957798 9780191957796 9780192692344 0192692348 9780192692337 019269233X |