Cover Image

Normativity, rationality, and reasoning : selected essays /

Show other versions (1)

This volume presents a selection of John Broome's most important work since 2000 in an area of philosophy where he has led the way. Topics discussed include the structure of normativity; the priority of oughts over reasons; the distinction between rationality and normativity; the character of h...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Broome, John, 1947- (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford ; New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2021.
Edition:First edition.
Subjects:
Reasoning.
Normativity (Ethics)
Practical reason.
Norme (Morale)
Raison pratique.
Epistemology.
PHILOSOPHY.
Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
Cognitive Psychology & Cognition.
PSYCHOLOGY.
Reasoning
Practical reason
Electronic books.
Informational works.
Documents d'information.
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Normativity, Rationality and Reasoning: Selected Essays
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • Introduction
  • Part A
  • Part B
  • Part C
  • PART A: NORMATIVITY
  • 1: Reason fundamentalism and what is wrong with it
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. The reasoned property and the oughted property
  • 3. The reasoned-for relation and the oughted-for relation
  • 4. Type relations
  • 5. Reducing the properties to the relations
  • 6. The property of being a reason reduced to the reasoned-for relation
  • 7. Apparent disagreements
  • 8. The property of being a reason reduced to the oughted-for relation
  • 9. Ought fundamentalism and reason fundamentalism
  • 10. The unfaithfulness of reason fundamentalism
  • 11. Conclusion in favour of ought fundamentalism
  • Note added in 2021
  • Acknowledgements
  • 2: Giving reasons and given reasons
  • 1. Introduction: giving reasons and given reasons
  • 2. Favouring and owning
  • 3. Reasons primitivism
  • 4. What is a given reason?
  • 5. Reasons primitivism again
  • 6. Conclusion
  • Acknowledgements
  • 3: The first normative 'reason'
  • Note
  • 4: A linguistic turn in the philosophy of normativity?
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. The place of 'ought' in linguistics
  • 3. The standard semantic theory
  • 4. The deontic and the normative
  • 5. Specialized vocabulary
  • 6. The central ought of normativity
  • 7. Enkrasia
  • 8. A problem with deontic logic
  • 9. An alternative semantics
  • Acknowledgements
  • 5: Williams on ought
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Logical structure
  • 3. Indexed oughts
  • 4. Indexation by motivation
  • 5. Ownership
  • 6. Williams's arguments
  • 7. A counterexample
  • 8. Did OMO recognize ownership?
  • 9. Conclusion
  • Acknowledgements
  • PART B: RATIONALITY
  • 6: Rationality versus normativity
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. The meaning of 'normative'
  • 3. Meanings of 'reason'
  • 4. The meaning of 'rational'
  • Substantive rationality
  • Reified rationality
  • 5. Reduction, entailment, and identity of requirements
  • 6. Normative compliance does not supervene on the mind
  • Does whether or not you ought to F supervene on your mind?
  • Your Fing does not supervene on your mind whenever you ought to F
  • 7. Rationality supervenes on the mind
  • 8. Conclusion
  • Acknowledgements
  • 7: Motivation
  • 1. The Possibility of Altruism
  • 2. Some explanatory schemes
  • 3. Opposing motivations
  • 4. Autonomous normativity
  • 5. Acting for a reason
  • 6. Intentions
  • 7. Instrumental rationality and reasoning
  • 8. Enkrasia and reasoning
  • Acknowledgements
  • PART C: REASONING
  • 8: Normativity in reasoning
  • 1. Reasoning
  • 2. Higher-order accounts of reasoning
  • 3. A first-order account of reasoning
  • 4. Following a rule
  • 5. Normative guidance
  • 6. Normative guidance in following a rule of reasoning
  • 7. Intentional guidance
  • 8. Habitual guidance
  • 9. Intentional guidance in following a rule of reasoning
  • 10. Conclusion
  • Acknowledgements
  • 9: A linking belief is not essential for reasoning