rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Radical skepticism and epistemic intuition
  name:
    name part: Bergmann, Michael
    name part: 1964-
    role:
      role term: creator
    role:
      role term: author.
  type of resource: text
  genre: bibliography
  genre: Electronic books.
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: enk
    date issued: 2021
    copyright date: 2021
    edition: First edition.
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: remote
    extent: 1 online resource
  abstract: "Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition rejects argument-based attempts to resist radical skepticism and advocates, instead, for noninferential intuition-based commonsense resistance inspired by the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. The book begins by setting aside closure-based arguments for radical skepticism and focusing on the more fundamental underdetermination arguments, which highlight the problematic gap between our evidence and our beliefs that are based on that evidence despite their truth being underdetermined by it. The rejected argument-based response to skepticism aims to provide good noncircular arguments from the evidence on which we base our ordinary beliefs (e.g. our perceptual and memory beliefs) to the conclusion that those beliefs are true or at least probable. Part I of the book finds all such anti-skeptical arguments wanting. Part II lays out and defends a unique version of the commonsense Reid-inspired response to radical skepticism, with two distinctive features. The first is its self-conscious, explicit, and extensive reliance on epistemic intuitions, which are seemings about the nature and exemplification of epistemic goods (such as justification or knowledge). The second is that it is ecumenical in the sense that it can be endorsed without difficulty by both internalists and externalists in epistemology. Part III of the book responds to objections to the commonsense reliance on epistemic intuitions proposed in Part II, with special attention given to challenges from underdetermination, epistemic circularity, disagreement, and experimental philosophy"--Publisher's description.
  note: Michael Bergmann.
  note: Includes bibliographical references and index.
  subject:
    topic: Skepticism
  subject:
    topic: Knowledge, Theory of
  subject:
    topic: Scepticisme
  subject:
    topic: Théorie de la connaissance
  subject:
    topic: epistemology
  subject:
    topic: PHILOSOPHY
  subject:
    topic: Metaphysics
  subject:
    topic: Knowledge, Theory of
  subject:
    topic: Skepticism
  classification: BD201 .B47 2021
  classification: 121.2
  related item:
    title info:
      title: Radical skepticism and epistemic intuition
    name:
      name part: Bergmann, Michael, 1964-
    origin info:
      publisher: Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2021
      edition: First Edition.
    identifier: (DLC) 2021940267
    identifier: (OCoLC)1231958376
  identifier: 9780192653574
  identifier: 0192653571
  identifier: 9780192898487
  identifier: 0191924768
  identifier: 9780191924767
  identifier: http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login
  record info:
    record content source: N$T
    record creation date: 210909
    record change date: 20260318163122.8
    record identifier: in00005695899
    language of cataloging:
      language term: eng