rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Clientelism
  name:
    name part: Trantidis, Aris
    role:
      role term: creator
    role:
      role term: author.
  name:
    name part: Cambridge University Press
  type of resource: text
  genre: bibliography
  genre: Electronic books.
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: enk
    date issued: 2025
    copyright date: 2025
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: remote
    extent: 1 online resource.
  abstract: "This Element examines clientelism and its impact on democratic institutions and markets, emphasizing that, alongside electoral competition, politics hosts two additional arenas: one where political actors seek campaign resources and active supporters, and another where socioeconomic actors pursue access to state-distributed resources. Clientelism emerges from reciprocal exchanges between these actors. Political parties use clientelism to incentivize collective action and organize campaigns. Playing this 'clientelist game', no party can reduce clientelistic practices without risking electoral defeat or internal fragmentation. Clientelism weakens the provision of public goods and skews policymaking to benefit clients over general welfare. Eventually, it generates an economic 'tragedy of the commons', as state resources are overexploited and the economy suffers, while formal institutions often fail to constrain it. Even in advanced democracies like the United States, political competition is not only electoral, targeting voters, but structurally clientelist. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core."--
  table of contents: Defining clientelism -- The logic of clientelist exchange -- Clientelism and the logic of political action -- The political party as a clientelist corporation -- Clientelism from the perspective of socioeconomic actors -- Organized client groups -- Concluding remarks for part I: Privileges for the few and government externalities for the many -- Clientelist bias in policymaking -- Clientelism as the inter-party equilibrium -- Clientelism and economic institutions -- Can we curb clientelism? -- Can institutions curb clientelism?
  note: Aris Trantidis.
  note: Includes bibliographical references.
  subject:
    topic: Patronage, Political
  subject:
    topic: Lobbying
  subject:
    topic: Political corruption
  subject:
    topic: Favoritisme
  subject:
    topic: Lobbying
  subject:
    topic: Corruption (Politique)
  classification: JF2111 .T73 2025
  classification: 324.2/04
  related item:
    name:
      name part: Trantidis, Aris,
    origin info:
      publisher: Cambridge, UK ;New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2025,
    identifier: (OCoLC)1533635397
  related item:
    title info:
      title: Cambridge elements
      part name: Elements in Austrian economics
  identifier: 9781009707626
  identifier: 1009707620
  identifier: 9781009707671
  identifier: 1009707671
  identifier: 9781009707664
  identifier: 1009707663
  identifier: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009707626
  record info:
    record content source: YDX
    record creation date: 250814
    record change date: 20260212202145.4
    record identifier: in00005687691
    language of cataloging:
      language term: eng