Formal models of crisis bargaining : applications in the politics of conflict /

Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Spaniel, William (Author)
Corporate Author:	ProQuest (Firm)
Format:	eBook
Language:	English
Published:	New York : Cambridge University Press, 2023.
Subjects:	Diplomatic negotiations in international disputes. Conflict management. Crisis management. Négociations diplomatiques dans les conflits internationaux. Gestion des conflits. Gestion de crise. Conflict management Crisis management Diplomatic negotiations in international disputes Electronic books.
Online Access:	Connect to the full text of this electronic book

Table of Contents:

Cover
Half-title
Endorsements
Title page
Imprints
Contents
List of Figures
Preface
1 Introduction: Why War?
1.1 The Rationality Assumption
1.2 The Unitary Actor Assumption
1.3 Model Simplicity
1.4 Roadmap
Part I Complete Information Models
2 War's Inefficiency Puzzle
2.1 When Do Mutually Acceptable Settlements Exist?
2.2 The Bargaining Range: A Geometric Interpretation
2.3 Ultimatum Bargaining
2.4 Is War Costly?
2.5 The Puzzle
2.6 Developing New Models
2.7 Key Readings
2.8 Exercises
3 Power and Commitment Problems
3.1 Preemptive War
3.2 Fait Accompli
3.3 Bargaining over Objects that Influence Future Power
3.4 Stalling
3.5 Conclusion
3.6 Key Readings
3.7 Exercises
4 Preventive War and Bargaining over Power
4.1 Exogenous Power Shifts and Preventive War
4.2 Endogenous Power Shifts
4.3 Costly Power Shifts
4.4 Unobservable Weapons Programs
4.5 Conclusion
4.6 Key Readings
4.7 Exercises
5 Hidden Commitment Problems
5.1 Compliance Problems
5.2 Hold-Up Problems
5.3 Issue Indivisibility
5.4 Risk Acceptance
5.5 Financing War
5.6 Conclusion
5.7 Key Readings
5.8 Exercises
Part II Incomplete Information Models
6 Uncertainty over Costs
6.1 Uncertainty over Costs
6.2 Balance of Power, Preponderance of Power, and Neutrality
6.3 Does Uncertainty Cause War?
6.4 Intelligence Gathering
6.5 Conclusion
6.6 Key Readings
6.7 Exercises
7 Uncertainty over Power
7.1 Modeling Uncertainty over Power
7.2 Peace Subsidies
7.3 Procedural Mediation
7.4 Strategic Uncertainty
7.5 Conclusion
7.6 Key Readings
7.7 Exercises
8 Cheap Talk and Incentives to Misrepresent
8.1 Defining Cheap Talk
8.2 Incentives to Misrepresent
8.3 Shuttle Diplomacy
8.4 Information Provision and Mediator Bias
8.5 Conclusion
8.6 Key Readings
8.7 Exercises
9 Military Mobilizations and Costly Signals
9.1 Resolve
9.2 War Costs
9.3 Martial Effectiveness
9.4 Conclusion
9.5 Key Readings
9.6 Exercises
10 Manipulating the Peace Premium
10.1 Risk and the Changing Costs of Conflict
10.2 Does High Resolve Cause War?
10.3 Uncertain Spoils and the Warrior's Curse
10.4 Conclusion
10.5 Key Readings
10.6 Exercises
11 Mechanism Design
11.1 Monotonicity Results
11.2 Uncertainty over Costs and an Existence Result
11.3 Uncertainty over Power and an Impossibility Result
11.4 Conclusion
11.5 Key Readings
11.6 Exercises
12 Fighting and Learning
12.1 Uncertainty over Military Resources
12.2 Uncertainty over Costs
12.3 Building Reputation
12.4 Conclusion
12.5 Key Readings
12.6 Exercises
Part III Appendices
Appendix 1 Discounting
Appendix 2 Derivatives of Implicit Functions
Appendix 2.1 Example: Optimal Investments
Appendix 2.2 Example: Changing Costs under Uncertainty
3 Mechanism Design Primer