Exit from international organizations : costly negotiation for institutional change /

Why do states exit international organizations (IOs)? How often does exit from IOs - including voluntary withdrawal and forced suspension - occur? What are the effects of leaving IOs for the exiting state? Despite the importance of membership in IOs, a broader understanding of exit across states, or...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Borzyskowski, Inken von (Author), Vabulas, Felicity (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2025.
Subjects:
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Half-title page
  • Title page
  • Copyright page
  • Contents
  • List of Figures
  • List of Tables
  • Acknowledgments
  • International Organization (IO) Abbreviations
  • Part I Introduction and Theory
  • 1 Understanding IO Exits
  • Theoretical Contributions: Exit as a Costly Strategy to Negotiate Change
  • Empirical Contributions
  • Broader Implications for International Cooperation
  • Defining Formal Intergovernmental Organizations, Withdrawals, and Suspensions
  • Our Data Collection Strategy and Some Basic Temporal Patterns
  • Withdrawals over Time
  • Suspensions over Time
  • A Rebuttal to Alternative Accounts
  • IO Exit Is Not Primarily Driven by Backlash against Globalization nor Nationalism/Populism
  • IO Exit Is Not Systematically Triggering an End to Cooperation
  • Membership (and Membership Exit) Is Consequential for World Politics
  • Chapter Overview
  • 2 Exit as a Costly Strategy to Negotiate Change
  • IOs Can Become Dissatisfying as State Preferences and Power Shift
  • Voice and Other Options before Exit
  • Why States Might Avoid Exit despite Dissatisfaction
  • Using Exit to Negotiate Change
  • The Consequences of IO Exit for Exiting States
  • Reputational Consequences for the Exiting State
  • Cooperative Consequences for the Exiting State
  • Material Consequences for the Exiting State and Why They Might Be Limited
  • Consequences of Exit for Institutional Change
  • Conclusion
  • Part II Withdrawal
  • 3 Predictors of Withdrawal: When and Why Do States Withdraw from IOs?
  • Theoretical Expectations on the Predictors of Withdrawal
  • Testable Implications
  • The Fuller Picture: Why States Withdraw from IOs
  • Which States Frequently Withdraw from IOs?
  • Which IOs Do States Frequently Withdraw From?
  • Withdrawal Threats
  • Justifications for Withdrawing
  • Return after Withdrawals
  • Multivariate Tests
  • Research Design
  • Regression Results on the Predictors of Withdrawals
  • Conclusion
  • 4 The Consequences of IO Withdrawal for Exiting States
  • Theorizing the Consequences of IO Withdrawal
  • Reputational Consequences
  • Cooperative Consequences
  • Material Consequences
  • Reputational, Cooperative, and Material Consequences: Multivariate Tests
  • The Reputational Consequences of Withdrawal
  • Do Reputational Effects Vary by State and IO?
  • Cooperative Consequences: UNSC Elections
  • Cooperative Consequences: Future Treaty Signing
  • The Material (Economic) Consequences of Withdrawal
  • Key Findings and Ways to Move Forward
  • 5 Case Studies: Three Withdrawals
  • Case Methodology
  • US Withdrawal from the International Labour Organization (ILO) (1975/77-1980)
  • Case Summary
  • Case Details
  • Synopsis
  • Japan's Withdrawal from the International Whaling Commission (IWC) (2018/19 to Present)
  • Case Summary
  • Case Details
  • Synopsis
  • UK Withdrawal from the European Union (EU) (2016/20 to Present)
  • Case Summary
  • Case Details
  • Synopsis