Aristotle on what emotions are /
This book provides the first systematic interpretation of what Aristotle thinks occurrent emotions are and points to some philosophical merits of his account. It is argued that he holds that emotions are representational pleasures or distresses that are formed in response to other intentional states...
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
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Oxford ; New York :
Oxford University Press,
[2024].
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| Series: | Oxford Aristotle studies.
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Table of Contents:
- Introduction : what this book aims to achieve (and what it doesn't). A map
- Some key terminology and distinctions. The prospects for an analysis of emotions in terms of other intentional states
- Part I. Emotions as pleasures and distresses
- Emotions as representational hedonic states
- Pleasure and distress as contributing to the individuation of emotion-types
- Emotions as hedonic states that are formed in response to intentional states that apprehend their objects
- Emotions and the account(s) of pleasure in the ethics
- Part II. Emotions and desires
- Anger (orgē)
- Some other (putative) links between emotions and desires
- Appetite (epithumia)
- Part III. The material dimension of emotions and some problematic cases
- The material or bodily dimension of emotions
- Some problematic cases and the supplements in the ee specification of the emotions
- Part IV. Further philosophical considerations and a significant philosophical advantage
- Contrast with a contemporary motivational theory. Which representational role(s) do emotions play?
- Explaining recalcitrant emotions with aristotle
- Catalogue of aristotle's emotions as representational pleasures or distresses.