A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation /

Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Ray, Debraj
Corporate Author: Oxford University Press
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2007.
Series:Lipsey lectures.
Subjects:
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Ingredients for a theory of agreements
  • Coalitions, cooperation and noncooperation
  • Irreversible agreements
  • Irreversible agreements: symmetric games
  • Applications
  • Irreversible agreements: the general case
  • A framework for reversible agreements
  • Reversible agreements without externalities
  • Reversible agreements with externalities
  • Blocking
  • Irreversible commitments
  • The blocking approach in real time
  • Directions.