rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Robust realism in ethics
    sub title: normative arbitrariness, interpersonal dialogue, and moral objectivity
  name:
    name part: Ingram, Stephen
    role:
      role term: creator
    role:
      role term: author.
  type of resource: text
  genre: bibliography
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: enk
    date issued: 2023
    copyright date: 2023
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: print
    extent: vii, 238 pages ; 24 cm.
  abstract: Stephen Ingram defends a robustly realistic metaethical theory, based on the concept of normative arbitrariness, of which he provides the first in-depth analysis. He argues that, in order to capture the normative non-arbitrariness of moral choice, we must commit to the existence of robustly stance-independent, categorical, irreducibly normative, non-natural moral facts. Specifically, he identifies five ways in which a metaethical theory might fail to capture the non-arbitrariness of moral choice. The first involves claims about the bruteness of moral attitudes or facts. The second involves claims about the privileging of some attitudes over others. The third involves the claim that some metaethical theories leave a normative deficit. The fourth involves a claim about our ownership over moral reality. And the fifth involves the claim that certain metaethical theories introduce a destabilising contingency into the moral domain. Ingram argues that robust realism is the theory that is best placed to avoid all five of these arbitrariness charges. He then goes on to show that, by exploring the nature of interpersonal moral dialogue, robust realists can defend epistemological and meta-semantic theories that are friendly to their view. Specifically, he defends a dualistic form of moral intuitionism on which some moral beliefs are justified on the basis of a priori intuitions, whilst others are justified on the basis of a posteriori moral experiences and provides a theory of 'moral mental files' to explain how moral terms and concepts are able to refer to robust moral facts.
  note: Stephen Ingram.
  note: Includes bibliographical references (pages [217]-233) and index.
  subject:
    topic: Ethics
  subject:
    topic: Realism
  classification: BJ1012 .I54 2023
  classification: 170
  identifier: 0198886489
  identifier: 9780198886488
  record info:
    record content source: YDX
    record creation date: 230313
    record change date: 20260727153406.2
    record identifier: in00004763630