http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
Cover -- Half Title -- Series -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Foreword -- Opening Statements -- 1. The Mind-Body Problem: Dualism Rebooted -- Introduction -- 1. The Mind-Body Problem -- 1.1. Dualism -- 1.2. Physicalism -- 2. The Consciousness Problem -- 2.1. Phenomenal Consciousness -- 2.2. The Problem -- 3. Why Consciousness Escapes the Physicalist Net -- 3.1. The Bat -- 3.2. The Color Scientist -- 3.3. The Zombie -- 4. Theories of Consciousness -- 4.1. Representationalism -- 4.2. Higher-Order Theory -- 4.3. Russellian Monism -- 5. Dualism Rebooted
5.1. The Irreducibility of the Phenomenal -- 5.2. What Science Does (and Doesn't) Tell Us -- 5.3. The Way Ahead -- 2. Non-standard Physicalism: The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness -- Introduction -- 1. What Consciousness Is -- 1.1. Phenomenal Consciousness -- 1.2. Complications -- 1.3. Higher-Order Consciousness -- 1.4. Access Consciousness -- 1.5. Relations Among These Notions -- 2. Consciousness and the World -- 2.1. The Conceivability Argument -- 2.2. The Epistemic View -- 2.3. Alternatives to This View -- 2.4. Features of This View -- 2.5. Objections to This View
3. The Metaphysics of the Science of Consciousness -- 3.1. Case Study: Aaronson Versus Tononi -- 3.2. The Laws of Consciousness Thesis -- 3.3. Are There Laws of Consciousness? -- 3.4. Consciousness Science Without the Laws? -- 3.5. Consciousness Science After Ignorance -- First Round of Replies -- 3. Ignorance Is No Defense: Reply to Daniel Stoljar -- Introduction -- 1. An Analogy -- 2. Why Should We Believe the Epistemic View? -- 3. What Does the Epistemic View Tell Us About the Metaphysics of Consciousness? -- 4. Where Does the Burden of Proof Lie?
4.1. Denying Physicalism Does Not Commit One to Something Spooky or Supernatural -- 4.2. Great Past Success Does Not Necessarily Mean Great Future Success -- 4.3. Considerations of Simplicity Do Not Settle the Matter -- 4.4. Should the Epistemic View Benefit From the Presumption in Favor of Physicalism? -- 5. Where Does That Leave Us? -- 4. Taking Non-Standard Options Seriously: Reply to Amy Kind -- Introduction -- 1. Russellian Monism -- 2. Kind's Critique -- 3. Must We Say What the Properties Are? -- 4. The Combination Problem -- 5. False Advertising -- 6. Non-standard and Non-Russellian?
7. Kind and the Structure and Dynamics Argument -- 8. Dualism 2.0 and the Conceivability Argument -- 9. The Mathematics Analogy -- 10. Reconsidering the Space of Options -- Second Round of Replies -- 5. The Consciousness Slugathon: Reply to Daniel Stoljar's Reply -- Introduction -- 1. The Non-Russellian Epistemic View -- 2. Is Dualism Impossible to Believe? -- 6. Even More Seriously: Reply to Amy Kind's Reply -- Introduction -- 1. Details Don't Matter -- 2. You're Not Done -- 3. Burden of Proof -- 4. Is Ignorance a Defense? -- Suggested Further Readings -- Glossary -- References -- Index
Description based upon print version of record.
Little Debates about Big Questions Series