A new swing-contract design for wholesale power markets /
"Growing reliance on variable energy resources and greater encouragement of demand-side participation have led to greater volatility and uncertainty in real-time net load (i.e., electric power usage net of non-dispatchable generation). This, in turn, has led to a greater need for the flexible p...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Hoboken, New Jersey :
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
[2021]
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| Series: | IEEE Press series on power engineering.
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Connect to the full text of this electronic book |
Table of Contents:
- 1 Introduction 9
- 2 U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed Wholesale Power Markets: Overview 15
- 2.1 Chapter Preview 15
- 2.2 General Goals for Wholesale Power Market Design 15
- 2.3 U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed Market Operations 16
- 2.4 Stresses Faced by Current U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed Markets 19
- 3 Motivation for Current Study 21
- 3.1 Chapter Preview 21
- 3.2 Problematic Design Aspects of U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed
- Wholesale Power Markets 21
- 3.2.1 Artificial Distinction Between Energy and Reserve 21
- 3.2.2 Problematic Use of Hedonic Pricing 22
- 3.2.3 Revenue Insufficiency and Incentive Problems 23
- 3.2.4 Computational Fragility of LMP Derivations 24
- 3.2.5 Performance Payment in Advance of Performance Delivery 26
- 3.2.6 Minimal Direct Representation of Retail Customer Interests 27
- 3.2.7 Reliance on Overly Simplistic Cost Conceptions 28
- 3.2.8 Use of Spot-Market Pricing for Forward Markets 30
- 3.3 Relation of Current Study to Previous Swing-Contract Work 30
- 4 Swing Contracts for ISO-Managed Wholesale Power Markets 33
- 4.1 Swing Contract Overview 33
- 4.2 Swing Contracts: General Formulation 33
- 4.3 Swing Contracts in Firm or Option Form 35
- 5 Illustrative Swing-Contract Reserve Offers 37
- 5.1 Chapter Preview 37
- 5.2 A Simple Energy-Block Swing Contract in Firm Form 38
- 5.3 An Energy-Block Swing Contract in Option Form 42
- 3
- 4 Contents
- 5.4 Swing-Contract Implementation of Standard Supply Offers 43
- 5.5 A Swing Contract Offering Continuous Swing (Flexibility) in
- Power and Ramp 48
- 5.6 A Swing Contract Offering Battery Services 50
- 5.7 Swing-Contract Facilitation of Private Bilateral Contracting 52
- 6 Swing-Contract Market Design 55
- 6.1 Chapter Preview 55
- 6.2 General Swing-Contract Market Formulation 55
- 6.3 Financial and Physical Feasibility of Swing-Contract Offers 57
- 6.4 Reserve Bids 58
- 6.5 Handling of Fixed Reserve Bids and Non-Dispatched Power 59
- 6.6 Performance Penalties and Incentives 60
- 6.7 ISO Cost Allocation 61.
- 7 Swing-Contract Market Optimization: Base-Case MILP Formulation 65
- 7.1 Chapter Preview 65
- 7.2 General Assumptions and Notation 66
- 7.3 Discretization of the ISO's Optimization Problem 67
- 7.4 ISO Objective Function 71
- 7.5 Complete Analytical MILP Formulation 72
- 7.6 Additional Discussion of Optimization Aspects 74
- 7.7 Five-Bus Test Case 76
- 7.8 Thirty Bus Test Case with Adaptive Reserve Zones 79
- 8 Inclusion of Reserve Offers with Price Swing 83
- 8.1 Chapter Preview 83
- 8.2 Cost Function Preliminaries 83
- 8.3 MILP Tractable Form of Reserve Offers with Price Swing 85
- 9 Inclusion of Price-Sensitive Reserve Bids 91
- 9.1 Chapter Preview 91
- 9.2 Incorporation of Benefits 92
- 9.3 Modeling of Price-Sensitive Reserve Bids 94
- 9.3.1 Standard Demand Function Formulation 94
- 9.3.2 Reserve Bids with Time-of-Use Pricing 95
- 9.3.3 Reserve Bids with Price Swing 95
- 9.3.4 Reserve Bids Directly Expressed as Benefit Functions 97
- 9.4 MILP Tractable Approximation of Benefit Functions 98
- 10 The Linked Swing-Contract Market Design 101
- 10.1 Chapter Preview 101
- 10.2 Multistage Optimization and Time Inconsistency 102
- 10.3 Settlement Time-Consistency of Swing-Contract Markets 105
- 10.4 Swing-Contract Long-Term Forward Markets 106
- 10.5 Swing-Contract Short-Term Forward Markets 107
- Contents 5
- 10.6 Swing-Contract Very Short-Term Forward Markets 109
- 10.7 Swing-Contract Deployment in Real-Time Operations 110
- 11 Illustration: Linked Day-Ahead and Hour-Ahead Swing-Contract
- Markets 113
- 11.1 Chapter Preview 113
- 11.2 Hour-Ahead Market with Reserve Offers Consisting of
- Swing-Contract Portfolios 114
- 11.3 SCED Solution for Hour-Ahead Swing-Contract Market 117
- 11.3.1 Overview 117
- 11.3.2 Power Balance 117
- 11.3.3 Coverage of the ISO's Uncertainty Set 119
- 11.3.4 Constrained Minimization of Expected Cost 121
- 11.4 Linked Day-Ahead and Hour-Ahead Markets 121
- 12 Standard Modeling of a Competitive Market 125.
- 12.1 Chapter Preview 125
- 12.2 Key Definitions 125
- 12.3 Standard Competitive Market Assumptions 126
- 12.4 Law of One Price for Commodities 126
- 12.5 Competitive Market: Basic Formulation 127
- 12.6 Net Surplus Extraction 130
- 12.7 Market Efficiency Metric 131
- 12.8 Market Efficiency and Pricing Rules 133
- 12.9 Strategic Trade Behavior and Trader Market Power 134
- 13 U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed Markets: Efficiency and Market Power 137
- 13.1 Chapter Preview 137
- 13.2 Daily Market Operations 137
- 13.3 Illustrative Analytical DAM Formulation 140
- 13.4 Net Surplus Extraction in the Illustrative DAM 141
- 13.5 Market Power in the Illustrative DAM: Type-I Error 145
- 13.6 Market Power in the Illustrative DAM: Type-II Error 149
- 13.7 Market Inefficiency in the Illustrative DAM. 153
- 13.8 DAM Performance: General Assessment 156
- 13.9 Scheduling of Bilateral Contracts 158
- 14 Comparisons with Swing-Contract Markets 161
- 14.1 Chapter Preview 161
- 14.2 Product Definition in U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed Markets 162
- 14.3 Wholesale Power and the Law of One Price (Not) 164
- 14.4 Differential vs. Uniform Pricing 165
- 14.5 Comparison of SC and Current U.S. DAM Designs 166
- 6 Contents
- 15 Advantages of the Linked Swing-Contract Market Design 169
- 15.1 Chapter Preview 169
- 15.2 SC Markets are Physically-Covered Insurance Markets 170
- 15.3 Longer-Term SC Markets Support New Investment 171
- 15.4 SC Markets Ensure Revenue Sufficiency 176
- 15.5 SC Markets Ameliorate Merit-Order Concerns 177
- 15.6 SC Markets are Robust-Control Mechanisms 178
- 15.7 SC Markets Reduce Rule Complexity 179
- 15.8 SC Markets Reduce Gaming Opportunities 180
- 15.9 SC Markets Have Smaller-Sized Optimizations 182
- 15.10 Additional Advantages of SC Markets 183
- 15.10.1 Ensure a Level Playing Field for Resource Participation 183
- 15.10.2 Permit Co-Optimization of Diverse Reserve 184
- 15.10.3 Appropriately Remunerate Diversity and Flexibility 184
- 15.10.4 Encourage Accurate Forecasting and Dispatch Following 184.
- 15.10.5 Ensure Settlement Time-Consistency 184
- 16 Gradual Transmission to Linked Swing-Contract Markets 185
- 16.1 Chapter Preview 185
- 16.2 A DAM Formulation Permitting Gradual Transition 187
- 16.3 Cost Function Preliminaries for the Transitional DAM189
- 16.4 MILP SCUC/SCED Optimization for the Transitional DAM 192
- 17 Swing-Contract Support for Integrated Transmission and
- Distribution Systems 201
- 17.1 Chapter Preview 201
- 17.2 Transactive Energy System Design for ITD Systems 203
- 17.3 Role of Distribution Utilities 207
- 17.4 An IDSO-Managed Bid-Based TES Design for Households 208
- 17.5 IDSOs as Grid-Edge Resource Aggregators 211
- 17.6 Swing-Contract Support for IDSO Participation in Wholesale
- Power Markets 212
- 18 Design Evaluation via the ITD TES Platform 213
- 18.1 Chapter Preview 213
- 18.2 Design Readiness Levels 213
- 18.3 An ITD TES Platform Permitting TES Design Evaluation 216
- 18.4 Illustrative Test Cases: Overview218
- 18.5 Illustrative Test Cases: Report 221
- 19 Potential Future Research Directions 227
- 20 Conclusion: The Dots Keep Connecting 231
- Contents 7
- 21 Appendices 233
- 21.1 Quick-Reference Glossary of Standard Acronyms 233
- 21.2 Quick-Reference Glossary of Transmission System Terms 234
- 21.3 Quick-Reference Glossary of Economic Terms 235
- 21.4 Nomenclature for a Swing-Contract Market 236
- 21.5 Nomenclature for a Distribution System 238
- References 239.