http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
For those who wonder how ethics and psychology fit into economics, Allan Schmid's innovative text, Conflict and Cooperation, explores the importance of moral judgments in settling conflicts of interest, and the vast effects of human behavior on economic theories and models. Investigating the institutional 'rules of the game' - both formal and informal - and how these rules change to serve competing interests, this text addresses the substantive impact of alternative institutions and institutional evolution. An economic framework emerges, acknowledging human learning and preference change, bounded rationality, and disequilibrium. With its broad applications and numerous practice and discussion questions, this text will appeal not only to students of economics, but also to those studying sociology, law, and political science.
Cover -- Table of Contents -- Foreword by Warren J. Samuels -- Preface -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Institutional Analysis -- 1.2 Outline of This Work -- 2 Institutional and Behavioral Economics Theory -- 2.1 Transactions as the Unit of Observation -- 2.1.1 Individuals and institutions -- 2.2 Levels of Analysis and Questions Asked -- 2.2.1 Impact analysis -- 2.2.2 Change analysis -- 2.2.3 Situation, structure, and performance (SSP) -- 2.2.4 Complementary theoretical frameworks: economizing and power -- 2.3 Theory: Variables and Processes -- 2.3.1 Variables -- 2.3.2 Processes (aspects of linked transactions) -- 2.4 Some Implications of the Variables and Processes: Systems Views -- 2.4.1 Continuity and change -- 2.4.2 Collective action -- 2.4.3 Theory of the state (legal ... economic nexus) -- 2.4.4 Economizing, power, and knowledge -- 2.4.5 The place of institutional economics in policy analysis -- 2.4.6 Conceptual pluralism -- 3 Behavioral Economics -- 3.1 Bounded Rationality -- 3.1.1 Limited information processing capacity -- 3.1.2 The modular brain, multiple self, and bounded self-control -- 3.1.3 Evolutionary psychology -- 3.2 Emotions and Evaluation -- 3.3 Behavioral Regularities: Characteristics of the Agent -- 3.3.1 The power of particulars and defaults -- 3.3.2 Availability -- 3.3.3 Anchoring -- 3.3.4 Experience over time: evaluation by representative moments -- 3.3.5 Predicting pleasure ... pain -- 3.3.6 Time-variant preferences -- 3.3.7 When a dollar is not a dollar -- 3.3.8 Perception of differences -- 3.3.9 Sunk costs -- 3.3.11 Selfishness and regard -- 3.3.12. Fairness -- 3.3.13 Satiation -- 3.3.14 Surprise and boredom -- 3.3.15 Framing inputs -- 3.4 Behavioral Law and Economics -- 3.5 Learning -- 3.5.1 Stimulus, behavior, and reinforcement -- 3.5.2 Cues and patterns -- 3.5.3 Belief persistence -- 3.5.4 What's your pleasure? -- 3.5.5 Preference formation and change -- 3.6 Conclusion -- 4 Individuals and Institutions -- 4.1 From Individual Experience to Institutions and Back Again -- 4.2 Evolutionary Theory -- 4.3 Uncertainty -- 4.4 Individual and Society -- 4.5 Emergence -- 4.6 Conclusion: Learning and Evolution -- 5 Institutions and Organizations -- 5.1 Human and Physical Relationships -- 5.2 Administrative, Bargained, and Customary Transactions -- 5.3 Organizations (Firms), Institutions, and Boundaries -- 5.4 Making Rules: The State -- 5.4.1 State and market -- 5.4.2 Informal institutions for making informal institutions -- 5.5 Social Choice (Conflict Resolution) -- 5.5.1 Specifying the state as an institutional variable -- 5.5.2 Specifying performance variables -- 5.5.3 Necessity for moral choice -- 5.5.4 Reasonable value -- 5.6 Conclusions -- 6 Sources of Human Interdependence -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Incompatibility -- 6.2.1 Externalities (interdependence) -- 6.2.2 Sustainability -- 6.3 Exclusion Cost -- 6.3.1 Prisoner's Dilemma and other games -- 6.3.2 Ways to unseat the free-rider -- 6.3.3 Common pool resources -- 6.3.4 Institutional change analysis -- 6.3.5 Policy implications -- 6.4 N.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 303-330) and index.