http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
Protection of substation critical equipment against intentional electromagnetic threats
The modern microprocessor based electronic equipment most vulnerable to Intentional Destructive Electromagnetic Interferences (IDEI) includes High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) in all substation equipment. However, power equipment and especially transformers are also subject to the influence of HEMP. The book discusses problems and solutions for both kinds of substation equipment. Separated into eight chapters, the book covers: Technological progress and its consequences; Intentional Destructive Electromagnetic Interferences (IDEI); Methods and means of Digital Protective Relay (DPR) protection from electromagnetic pulse; Passive methods and means of DPR protection from electromagnetic pulse; Active methods and means of DPR protection from electromagnetic pulse; Tests of DPR resistance to IDEI impacts; Organizational and technical measures to protect DPR from HEMP; and Protection of power equipment and transformers from HEMP. Key features: - Practical approach focusing on technical solutions for difficult problems. - Full data on electromagnetic threats and methods of their prevention are concentrated. - Addresses a gap in knowledge in the power system industry. This book emphasizes practical recommendations on protection of power substations' electric equipment from IDEI that intended for not only staff operating electric equipment, but also for manufacturers of this equipment, specialists of designing companies, managers of electric energy industry as well as for teachers and postgraduate students.
Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- About the Author -- Preface -- Chapter 1 Technical Progress and Its Consequences: The Philosophy Behind Technical Progress -- 1.1 Technical Progress in Relay Protection -- 1.2 Microprocessors -- The Basis of the Contemporary Stage of Technical Progress -- 1.3 Smart Grid -- A Dangerous Vector of 'Technical Progress' in Power Engineering -- 1.4 Dangerous Trends in the Development of Relay Protection Equipment -- References -- Chapter 2 Intentional Destructive Electromagnetic Threats -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 A Brief Historical Background -- 2.3 The First Reliable Information on HEMP as Well as Protection Methods in the Field of Electrical Power Engineering -- 2.4 The Actual Situation with Respect to the Protection of Power Electrical Systems from HEMP and other Types of Intentional Destructive Electromagnetic Threats -- 2.5 Medium and Short-Range Missile Systems -- Potential Sources of Intentional Destructive Electromagnetic Threats that Anti-Missile Defence Systems Are Powerless to Defend Against -- 2.6 What is Needed to Actually Defend the Country Against an 'Electromagnetic Armageddon'? -- 2.7 The Classification and Specifics of High Power Electromagnetic Threats -- 2.8 The Effect of HPEM on Microprocessor-based Relay Protection Systems -- 2.9 The Principle Technical Standards in the HEMP Field -- References -- Chapter 3 Methods and Techniques of Protecting DPR from EMP -- 3.1 The Sensitivity of DPR to Electromagnetic Threats -- 3.2 Methods of Protection from HEMP -- References -- Chapter 4 Passive Methods and Techniques of Protecting DPR from EMP -- 4.1 Cabinets -- 4.2 The Earthing of Sensitive Electronic Apparatus -- 4.3 HEMP Filters -- 4.3.1 Ferrite Filters -- 4.3.2 LC Section-based Filters -- 4.4 Non-linear Overvoltage Limiters -- 4.5 Shielding of the Control Cables.
4.6 Design Changes to DPR -- 4.6.1 Analogue Input Points -- 4.6.2 Discrete Input Points -- 4.6.3 Output Relays -- 4.6.4 Printed Boards -- 4.7 Construction Materials -- References -- Chapter 5 Active Methods and Techniques of Protecting DPR from EMP -- 5.1 A New Principle in the Active Protection of DPR -- 5.2 Current and Voltage Sensors with Regulated Pickup Threshold based on Reed Switches -- 5.3 Technical and Economic Aspects Affecting the Active Methods of Protecting DPR -- 5.4 Protecting the Circuit Breaker Remote Control System -- References -- Chapter 6 Testing the DPR Immunity to HPEM -- 6.1 An Analysis of Sources of HPEM -- 6.2 The Parameters of Testing DPR for Immunity to HEMP -- 6.3 The Parameters for Testing Immunity to Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) -- 6.4 Testing Equipment for Testing Immunity to HPEM -- 6.5 Use of the Performance Criteria During Testing of Electronic Apparatus for Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) -- 6.6 The Idiosyncrasies of using Performance Criteria during Testing of Microprocessor Based Relay Protection Devices for their Immunity to HPEM -- 6.7 A critique of the Method of Testing of the DPR Used in [6.16] -- 6.8 An Analysis of the Results of the Second Independent Test of a DPR of the Same Type -- 6.9 Conclusions and Recommendations for Testing Microprocessor Based Protective Relays -- References -- Chapter 7 Administrative and Technical Measures to Protect DPR from EMP -- 7.1 Problems with the Standardization of DPR -- 7.1.1 Who Coordinates the Process of Standardization in the Field of Relay Protection? -- 7.1.2 The Fundamental Principles of the Standardization of DPR -- 7.2 The Fundamental Principles for the Standardization of DPR Testing -- 7.2.1 A New Look at the Problem -- 7.2.2 Modern Testing Systems to Test Protective Relays.
7.2.3 The Problems with Modern Protective Relay Testing Systems -- 7.2.4 A Proposed Solution to the Problem -- 7.3 Establishment of Reserves of Electronic Equipment Replacement Modules as a Way to Improve the Survivability of the Power System -- 7.3.1 Optimizing the Capacity of Reserves of Replacement Modules -- 7.3.2 The Problem of Storing SPTA Reserves -- References -- Chapter 8 Protecting High-Power Electrical Equipment from EMP -- 8.1 The Magneto-Hydrodynamic Effect of HEMP -- 8.2 The Influence of the E3 HEMP Component on High-Power Electrical Equipment -- 8.3 Protection of High-Power Equipment from the Impact of Geo-Magnetically Induced Currents (GIC) -- References -- Appendix: EMP and its Impact on the Power System -- List of Reports -- I. EMP Theory -- II. Geomagnetically Induced Currents and its Impact on Power System -- III. EMP Impact on Power System -- Index -- EULA.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Chichester, West Sussex : John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2017