| Abstract: | Thucydides's Trap has been in vogue recently. It refers to the Peloponnesian War fought by Athens and Spartan, a war that was ostensibly caused by the fear that a rising Athens had caused in Sparta. It warns that history may repeat itself as contemporary China increases its power relative to the U.S. How enlightening -- or misleading -- is an analogy based on the ancient Greek world of some 2,500 years ago for understanding contemporary international relations? How accurate is the depiction of history of other large armed conflicts, such as the two world wars, as a challenge mounted by a rising power to challenge and displace an incumbent hegemon? This book offers a critique of the historical interpretations and logic of analysis underpinning the claims of Thucydides's Trap and power-transition theory, and it examines past instances of peaceful accommodation for lessons that can ease the frictions in ongoing Sino-American relations. |
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