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Radicalizing enactivism : basic minds without content /

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Hutto and Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition which holds that some kinds of minds - basic minds - are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. It opposes the widely endorsed thesis that cognition...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Hutto, Daniel D.
Other Authors: Myin, Erik
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2013.
©2013
Subjects:
Cognition > Philosophy.
Philosophy and cognitive science.
Philosophy of mind.
Cognitive science.
Content (Psychology)
PHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General
COGNITIVE SCIENCES/General
Electronic books.
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Description
Summary:Hutto and Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition which holds that some kinds of minds - basic minds - are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. It opposes the widely endorsed thesis that cognition always and everywhere involves content. The authors defend the counter-thesis that there can be intentionality and phenomenal experience without content, and demonstrate the advantages of their approach for thinking about scaffolded minds and consciousness.
Physical Description:1 online resource
ISBN:0262312174
9780262312172
1283906406
9781283906401
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262018548.001.0001