rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Consciousness and persons
    sub title: unity and identity
  name:
    name part: Tye, Michael.
    role:
      role term: creator
  type of resource: text
  genre: bibliography
  genre: Electronic books.
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: mau
    place:
      place term: Cambridge, Mass
    publisher: MIT Press
    date issued: ©2003
    date issued: 2003
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: remote
    extent: 1 online resource (xv, 203 pages) : illustrations.
  abstract: In Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity, Michael Tye takes on the thorny issue of the unity of consciousness and answers these important questions: What exactly is the unity of consciousness? Can a single person have a divided consciousness? What is a single person? Tye argues that unity is a fundamental part of human consciousness--something so basic to everyday experience that it is easy to overlook. For example, when we hear the sound of waves crashing on a beach and at the same time see a red warning flag, there is an overall unity to our experience; the sound and the red shape are presented together in our consciousness. Similarly, when we undergo a succession of thoughts as we think something through, there is an experience of succession that unifies the thoughts into a conscious whole. But, Tye shows, consciousness is not always unified. Split-brain subjects, whose corpus callosum has been severed, are usually taken to have a divided or disunified consciousness. Their behavior in certain situations implies that they have lost the unity normal human subjects take for granted; it is sometimes even supposed that a split-brain subject is really two persons. Tye begins his account by proposing an account of the unity of experience at a single time; this account is extended over the succeeding chapters to cover bodily sensations at a single time and perceptual experience, bodily sensations, conscious thoughts, and felt moods at a single time. Tye follows these chapters with a discussion of the unity of experience through time. Turning to the split-brain phenomenon, he proposes an account of the mental life of split-brain subjects and argues that certain facts about these subjects offer support for his theory of unity. Finally, addressing the topic of the nature of persons and personal identity, Tye finds the two great historical accounts--the ego theory and the bundle theory--lacking and he makes an alternative proposal. He includes an appendix on the gene…
  note: Michael Tye.
  note: "A Bradford book."
  subject:
    topic: Consciousness
  subject:
    topic: Whole and parts (Philosophy)
  subject:
    topic: PHILOSOPHY/General
  subject:
    topic: COGNITIVE SCIENCES/General
  classification: B808.9 .T935 2003eb
  classification: 126
  identifier: 9780262285308
  identifier: 0262285304
  identifier: 1423728580
  identifier: 9781423728580
  identifier: 026220147X (alk. paper)
  identifier: http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login
  record info:
    record content source: OCoLC-P
    record creation date: 051006
    record change date: 20221121162528.5
    record identifier: in00004601728
    language of cataloging:
      language term: eng