Table of Contents:
  • part 1 Part I: Voting
  • chapter Introduction to Part I
  • chapter 1 Two Candidates
  • chapter 2 Social Choice Functions
  • chapter 3 Criteria for Social Choice
  • chapter 4 Which Methods Are Good?
  • chapter 5 Arrow's Theorem
  • chapter 6 Variations on the Theme
  • chapter Notes on Part I
  • part 2 Part II: Apportionment
  • chapter Introduction to Part II
  • chapter 7 Hamilton's Method
  • chapter 8 Divisor Methods
  • chapter 9 Criteria and Impossibility
  • chapter 10 The Method of Balinski and Young
  • chapter 11 Deciding among Divisor Methods
  • chapter 12 History of Apportionment in the United States
  • chapter Notes on Part II
  • part 3 Part III: Conflict
  • chapter Introduction to Part III
  • chapter 13 Strategies and Outcomes
  • chapter 14 Chance and Expectation
  • chapter 15 Solving Zero-Sum Games
  • chapter 16 Conflict and Cooperation
  • chapter 17 Nash Equilibria
  • chapter 18 The Prisoner's Dilemma
  • chapter Notes on Part III
  • part 4 Part IV: The Electoral College
  • chapter Introduction to Part IV
  • chapter 19 Weighted Voting
  • chapter 20 Whose Advantage?
  • chapter Notes on Part IV
  • chapter Solutions to Odd-Numbered Exercises and Problems.