Divine foreknowledge and human freedom : the coherence of theism : omniscience /

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Craig, William Lane
Corporate Author: EBSCOhost
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Leiden ; New York : E.J. Brill, [1990]
Series:Brill's studies in intellectual history ; v. 19.
Subjects:
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • I. Theological fatalism
  • A.N. Prior
  • Nelson Pike
  • II. Reduction of theological to logical fatalism
  • III. Logical fatalism
  • Richard Taylor
  • Taylor's response to his critics
  • IV. Suggested escapes from fatalism
  • Denial of the principle of bivalence or the law of excluded middle
  • Status of the principle of bivalence
  • Grounds for denying bivalence of future contingent propositions
  • Grounds for affirming bivalence of future contingent propositions
  • Bivalence of all propositions
  • Falsity of all future contingent propositions
  • Logical form of future contingent propositions
  • Unidentifiability of future individuals
  • Timelessness of truth
  • Tensed vs. tenseless truth-bearers
  • Omnitemporal vs. atemporal truth
  • Conclusion
  • V. "Within one's power"
  • Taylor on "within one's power"
  • Necessitas consequentiae and personal power
  • Conditions and consequences
  • Fatalism about the past vs. fatalism about the future
  • Changing the past vs. changing the future
  • Causing the future vs. causing the past
  • VI. Backward causation
  • part I: The alleged logical impossibility of retro-causation
  • Dummett's defense of backward causation
  • The logical objection to backward causation
  • Antony Flew
  • Michael Scriven
  • Richard Gale
  • Richard Swinburne
  • Assessment of the logical objection
  • Two words of caution
  • Assessment
  • Logical and metaphysical modality
  • Part II: Purported instances of retro-causation
  • Neural physiology
  • Particle pair creation/annihilation
  • Classical electrodynamics
  • Tachyons
  • Superluminal particles and backward causation
  • The reinterpretation principle
  • The logically pernicious self-inhibitor
  • A perspectival special theory of relativity
  • Precognition
  • Experimental evidence
  • Retro-causal explanation
  • Difficulties in retro-causal explanation
  • Time travel
  • A word of caution
  • The possibility of time travel
  • Stock objections to time travel
  • The logically pernicious self-inhibitor
  • Circular causation
  • Part III: The metaphysical impossibility of retro-causation
  • The A-theory and backward causation
  • Superiority of the A-theory
  • Application to purported instances of backward causation
  • Conclusion.
  • VII. "Within one's power" once more
  • Power and counterfactual openness
  • Failure of fatalism
  • Conclusion
  • VIII. Transition to theological fatalism
  • Prior
  • Pike
  • Conclusion
  • IX. Temporal necessity
  • Contemporary debate from Pike to Plantinga
  • John Turk Saunders vs. Nelson Pike
  • Marilyn Adams
  • John Fischer
  • Alfred J. Freddoso
  • Alvin Plantinga
  • Assessment of the debate
  • Toward understanding temporal necessity
  • Backward causation and intuitions of the past's necessity
  • Fatalism and ability
  • Conclusion
  • X. Newcomb's paradox
  • The puzzle conditions
  • Theological implications
  • Nozick's dilemma
  • Divine foreknowledge and the one-box strategy
  • Objections to the one-box strategy
  • Backward causation
  • Backtracking counterfactuals
  • Newcomb's paradox and freedom
  • Conclusion
  • XI. Foreknowledge and freedom of God
  • Foreknowledge and human deliberation
  • Foreknowledge and divine deliberation
  • Conclusion
  • XII. The basis of divine foreknowledge
  • God's ability to know future contingents
  • Knowledge vs. true belief
  • Conclusion
  • XIII. Middle knowledge
  • The doctrine of middle knowledge
  • Natural, middle, and free knowledge
  • Theological ramifications
  • Grounds for affirming middle knowledge
  • Objections to middle knowledge
  • Middle knowledge and passivity in God
  • Middle knowledge and divine freedom
  • Conclusion
  • Appendix I: Is the special theory of relativity fatalistic?