Wittgenstein on aspect perception /

"The perception of what he calls 'aspects' preoccupied Wittgenstein and gave him considerable trouble in his final years. The Wittgensteinian aspect defies any number of traditional philosophical dichotomies, the aspect is neither subjective (inner, metaphysically private) nor objecti...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Baz, Avner, 1964- (Author)
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, [2020]
Series:Cambridge elements. Elements in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Subjects:

MARC

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490 1 |a Cambridge elements. Elements in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references (pages [52]-55). 
505 0 |a Introduction -- The grammar and phenomenology of Wittgensteinian aspects -- Aspects and concepts -- Aspects as perceived internal relations --Continuous aspect perception? -- Aspects and perceptual indeterminacy -- The significance of aspect perception -- Appendix : The natural attitude and the limitations of the Wittgensteinian grammatical investigation. 
520 |a "The perception of what he calls 'aspects' preoccupied Wittgenstein and gave him considerable trouble in his final years. The Wittgensteinian aspect defies any number of traditional philosophical dichotomies, the aspect is neither subjective (inner, metaphysically private) nor objective. It presents perceivable unity and sense that are (arguably) not (yet) conceptual. It is 'subject to the will,' but at the same time is normally taken to be genuinely revelatory of the object perceived under it. This Element begins with a grammatical and phenomenological characterization of Wittgensteinian 'aspects.' It then challenges two widespread ideas, that aspects are to be identified with concepts and that aspect perception has a continuous version that is characteristic of (normal) human perception. It concludes by proposing that aspect perception brings to light the distinction between the world as perceived and the world as objectively construed, and the role we play in the constitution of the former. 
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