Cover Image

The art of political control in China /

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Mattingly, Daniel C. (Author)
Corporate Author: Cambridge University Press
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2020.
Series:Cambridge studies in comparative politics.
Subjects:
Political leadership > China.
Social control > China.
China > Politics and government.
Electronic books.
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • 1. Introduction
  • 1.1.Making Autocracy Work
  • 1.2.The Outcome: Political Control
  • 1.3.Existing Explanations for Political Control
  • 1.4.A Theory of Political Control
  • 1.4.1.Cultivating Civil Society
  • 1.4.2.Co-optation
  • 1.4.3.Infiltration
  • 1.4.4.How Autocrats Chose Strategies of Control
  • 1.5.Challenges to Conventional Wisdom
  • 1.6.Research Design
  • 1.7.Overview of the Book
  • 2.A Theory of Political Control
  • 2.1.The Limits of Formal Institutions
  • 2.2.Informal Institutions of Control
  • 2.3.Cultivating Civil Society
  • 2.3.1.The Limits of Cultivating Civil Society
  • 2.4.Co-optation
  • 2.4.1.The Limits of Co-optation
  • 2.5.Infiltration
  • 2.5.1.The Limits of Infiltration
  • 2.6.How Autocrats Chose Strategies of Informal Control
  • 2.7.Conclusion
  • 3.The Communist Party's Governance Challenge
  • 3.1.Key Social Institutions in Rural China
  • 3.1.1.Lineage Groups
  • 3.1.2.Folk Religious Organizations
  • 3.2.Key Political Institutions in Rural China
  • 3.2.1.Village Committees
  • 3.2.2.Village-Level CCP Bodies
  • 3.2.3.How Village Elections Strengthen Authoritarian Control
  • 3.3.Key Government Mandates in Rural China
  • 3.3.1.Land Expropriation and Development
  • 3.3.2.Family Planning Policy
  • 3.3.3.Stability Maintenance
  • 3.4.The Communist Party's Governance Challenge
  • 3.4.1.Hypotheses about Political Trust and Mobilization
  • 3.4.2.Results from an Experiment on Political Trust in Rural China
  • 3.5.Conclusion
  • 4.Cultivating Civil Society
  • 4.1.Lineage Groups and Informal Control
  • 4.1.1.Structured Case Study Evidence
  • 4.1.2.Survey Evidence on Lineages
  • 4.1.3.Beyond China: Caste and Kin in Moghul India
  • 4.2.Religious Associations and Informal Control
  • 4.2.1.Structured Case Study Evidence
  • 4.2.2.Survey Evidence on Religion
  • 4.2.3.Beyond China: Company Towns in the US
  • 4.3.Beyond Kinship and Religion: Workers and Unions
  • 4.4.Conclusion
  • 5.Co-optation
  • 5.1.Lineage Elites, Moral Authority, and Control
  • 5.1.1.The Role of Lineage Elites in Rural Society
  • 5.1.2.An Experimental Test of Moral Authority
  • 5.1.3.Structured Case Study Evidence
  • 5.1.4.Survey Evidence on Kin Group Brokers
  • 5.1.5.Beyond China: The Enclosure Movement in Scotland
  • 5.2.Religious Leaders, Co-optation, and Control
  • 5.2.1.Structured Case Study Evidence on Religious Brokers
  • 5.2.2.Survey Evidence on Religious Brokers
  • 5.2.3.Beyond China: Urban Renewal in New Haven
  • 5.3.Conclusion
  • 6.Infiltration
  • 6.1.Infiltration and the Reach of the State
  • 6.2.Structured Case Study Evidence
  • 6.2.1.Wujia Village: Low Infiltration, Weak Control
  • 6.2.2.Taiping Village: High Infiltration, Strong Control
  • 6.3.Survey Evidence on Infiltration
  • 6.3.1.Infiltration Helps the State Requisition Land
  • 6.3.2.Infiltration Helps Enforce Family Planning Policies
  • 6.3.3.Infiltration Decreases Satisfaction with the State
  • 6.3.4.Results from a Natural Experiment
  • 6.4.Infiltration as a Substitute for Other Strategies
  • 6.5.Conclusion
  • 7.Conclusion
  • 7.1.Main Findings
  • 7.2.When Things Fall Apart
  • 7.2.1.The Strange Case of Wukan
  • 7.3.Implications for Understanding the Rise of China
  • 7.4.Implications for Governance in Autocracies
  • A.Additional Figures and Tables
  • B.Survey Design
  • C.Qualitative Research Design.