http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
Focusing primarily on Plato, Aristotle and the Pyrrhonian skeptics, Fine discusses the following questions, among others, does Socrates, in the Apology, claim to know that he knows nothing? How do Plato and Aristotle conceive of doxa and epistêmê? Are doxa and epistêmê belief and knowledge as we conceive of them nowadays? Do Plato and Aristotle allow us to have doxa of everything about which we can have epistêmê? How does Plato conceive of perception in the Phaedo and in Theaetetus 184-6? How should we understand his theory of recollection in the Phaedo? Do the Pyrrhonian skeptics disavow all beliefs? Do they have a conception of purely subjective experience? Do they take anything to be subjective? Are they external world skeptics? How do their views of subjectivity and skepticism compare with Descartes'? Taken as a whole, the essays explain why ancient epistemology is instructive and illuminating for us today.
Part I: Plato and [Plato]. Does Socrates clam to know that he knows nothing? -- Knowledge and true belief in the Meno -- The "two worlds" theory in the Phaedo -- Epistêmê and Doxa, knowledge and belief, in the Phaedo -- Recollection and innatism in the Phaedo -- Plato on the grades of perception : Theaetetus 184-186 and the Phaedo -- Meno's paradox and the Sisyphus -- Part II: Aristotle. Aristotle on knowledge -- Aristotle's two worlds : knowledge and belief in Posterior Analytics 1.33 -- Part III: Sextus. Skeptical Dogmata : Outlines of Pyrrhonism I 13 -- Subjectivity, ancient and modern : the Cyrenaics, Sextus, and Descartes -- Descartes and ancient skepticism : reheated cabbage? -- Sextus and external world skepticism.
Includes bibliographical references (pages [391]-405) and index.