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Managerial dilemmas : the political economy of hierarchy /

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Miller, Gary J.
Corporate Author: Cambridge University Press
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Cambridge [England] ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Series:Political economy of institutions and decisions.
Subjects:
Industrial management.
Organizational behavior.
Psychology, Industrial.
Employee motivation.
Incentives in industry.
Electronic books.
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • pt. I. Why have hierarchy? Market failures and hierarchical solutions: the tension between individual and social rationality ; Bargaining failure: coordination, bargaining, and contracts ; Voting failure: social choice in a dictatorial hierarchy
  • pt. II. Managerial dilemmas. Horizontal dilemmas: social choice in a decentralized hierarchy ; Vertical dilemmas: piece-rate incentives and credible commitments ; Hidden action in hierarchies: principals, agents, and teams ; Hidden information in hierarchies: the logical limits of mechanism design ; Hierarchical failures and market solutions: can competition create efficient incentives for hierarchy?
  • pt. III. Cooperation and leadership. The possibilities of cooperation: repeated vertical dilemmas ; The indeterminacy of cooperation: conventions, culture, and commitments ; The political economy of hierarchy: commitment, leadership and property rights
  • Epilogue: Politics, rationality, and efficiency.