Military realism : the logic and limits of force and innovation in the US Army /

After the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army considered counterinsurgency (COIN) a mistake to be avoided. Many found it surprising, then, when setbacks in recent conflicts led the same army to adopt a COIN doctrine. Scholarly debates have primarily employed existing theories of military bureaucracy or cultu...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Campbell, Peter P. (Author)
Format:	Book
Language:	English
Published:	Columbia : University of Missouri, [2019]
Series:	American military experience series.
Subjects:	United States > Military policy. Military doctrine > United States > History > 20th century. Military doctrine > United States > History > 21st century. HISTORY / Military / Strategy. HISTORY / Military / United States.

Table of Contents:

Military Realism
Flexible Response, the Nuclear Battlefield, and Counterinsurgency: Kennedy and Army Doctrine in the 1960s
Army Doctrine in the Shadow of Vietnam: Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 1968
From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Cold War Doctrine of the '70s and '80s
The Power Projection Army: Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era until the Eve of September 11
Transforming under Fire: The Global War on Terror, Counterinsurgency, Iraq, and Operations 2008.