Strategic justice : convention and problems of balancing divergent interests /

Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Vanderschraaf, Peter, 1962- (Author)
Format:	Book
Language:	English
Published:	New York : Oxford University Press, [2019]
Series:	Oxford moral theory.
Subjects:	Justice (Philosophy)

Table of Contents:

1. Dilemmas of Interaction
Introduction
1.1. Five Motivating Problems
1.2. Noncooperative Game Theory
1.3. Revisiting the Motivating Problems
Conclusion
2. Coordination, Conflict, and Convention
Introduction
2.1. Sampling of Earlier Discussions of Convention
2.2. Arbitrariness of Conventions
2.3. Convention and Correlated Equilibrium
2.4. Defining Convention
Conclusion
3. Circumstances of Justice
Introduction
3.1. Standard Account
3.2. Standard Account Meets Leviathan
3.3. Standard Account Meets Hume's Account
3.4. Playing Instruments and Hunting Stags
3.5. Alternative Account
Conclusion
4. Dynamics of Anarchy
Introduction
4.1. Two Accounts of Anarchy
4.2. Hybrid A Priori Models of Anarchy
4.3. Dynamical Model of Anarchy
Conclusion
5. Playing Fair
Introduction
5.1. Fair Division
5.2. Costly Punishment and Joint Cooperation
Conclusion
6. Limited Leviathan
Introduction
6.1. Two Problems
6.2. Hobbes' Attempt to Justify Commonwealth
6.3. Governing Convention
6.4. Democracy via Salience
Conclusion
7. Foole, the Shepherd, and the Knave
Introduction
7.1. Reconciliation Project and the Foole's Challenge
7.2. Glaucon and Adeimantus' Challenge
7.3. Hobbes' Response to the Foole Interpreted as a Folk Theorem Response
7.4. Invisible Foole
7.5. Combining the Social-Sanctions and the Inseparable-Goods Approaches
Conclusion
8. Justice as Mutual Advantage?
Introduction
8.1. Necessary Conditions for Justice as Mutual Advantage
8.2. Vulnerability Objection
8.3. Three Unsatisfactory Responses
8.4. Indefinitely Repeated Provider-Recipient Game
8.5. Setting the Boundaries
8.6. Too Many Equilibria?
Conclusion.