http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
interpersonal relationships in international conflict
Cover; Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict; Copyright; Dedication; Preface and Acknowledgements; Contents; Abbreviations; Introduction: The Interpersonal is the International; CONCEPTUALIZING TRUST: THE PRESENCE/ABSENCE OF RISK CALCULATION; Calculative Trust; Face-to-Face Interaction as an Index of Trustworthiness; Bonding Trust; SIGNALLING THEORY; CASE SELECTION AND KEY ASSUMPTIONS; USA-Soviet Union; India-Pakistan; USA-Iran; Signallers Can Be Assumed to Have Peaceful Intent; State Leaders as Signallers; The Referent for Trust; PLAN OF THE BOOK.
NOTESPart One; 1: Trust, Signalling, and International Relations; BUILDING TRUST THROUGH A â#x80;#x98;LEAP IN THE DARK'; THE INCREMENTALIST APPROACH TO TRUST-BUILDING; BUILDING TRUST THROUGH COLLECTIVE IDENTITY FORMATION; THE INDIVIDUALIST APPROACH TO TRUST-BUILDING; THE â#x80;#x98;INTERPERSONAL' IN THE EMERGENCE OF TRUST; CONCLUSION; NOTES; 2: Trust: Face to Face; ACQUIRING AN INDEX FOR ANOTHER ACTOR'S INTENT AND INTEGRITY; Testing out Intuitions of Security Dilemma Sensibility Face to Face; Promises: Face to Face; A THEORY OF BONDING TRUST; The Positive Identification of Interests; Humanization.
TRACING THE CAUSAL PROCESS FROM BONDING TO SUSPENSION IN FACE-TO-FACE INTERACTIONDiscursive Evidence of the Bonding Process; The Absence of Risk Calculation; CONCLUSION; NOTES; 3: Enemy Images; THE SECURITY DILEMMA; THE PROBLEM OF OFFENCE-DEFENCE DIFFERENTIATION; UNCERTAINTY ABOUT FUTURE INTENTIONS; PEACEFUL/DEFENSIVE SELF-IMAGES; IDEOLOGICAL FUNDAMENTALISM; CONCLUSION; NOTES; 4: The Priority of Trust in Signal Interpretation; GRIT; Limits of GRIT; Accurate Signal Interpretation; The Trust-Gap in Osgood's GRIT; THE REASSURANCE GAME; CONCLUSION; NOTES.
5: From Interpersonal Trust to Security CommunitiesTRUST IN SECURITY COMMUNITIES; TRUST AS THE RESULT OF NEW COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES; TRUST AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE; CONCLUSION; NOTES; Part Two; 6: USA-Soviet Union, 1985-1989; THE FAILURE OF GORBACHEV'S GRIT; REAGAN AND GORBACHEV: TRUST FACE TO FACE; Geneva; Reykjavik; TRUST IN THE MAKING OF THE INF TREATY; The Washington Summit; The Moscow Summit; GORBACHEV AND BUSH: FROM UNCERTAINTY TO TRUST; RIVAL CLAIMS; The Nuclear Revolution and Changing Soviet Beliefsabout US Intentions; Soviet Material Weakness; Costly Signalling; Vividness.
CONCLUSIONNOTES; 7: India-Pakistan, 1998-1999; INTERPERSONAL INTERACTION, BUT NO TRUST; VAJPAYEE AND SHARIF BOND OVER LUNCH IN NEW YORK; VAJPAYEE AND SHARIF ORCHESTRATEA SUMMIT AT LAHORE; FACE-TO-FACE AT LAHORE; THE SECRET BACKCHANNEL FAILS TO SOLVETHE KASHMIR CONFLICT; RIVAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE SIGNALLING PROCESS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN; US Pressure; Nuclear Fear; DID SHARIF BETRAY VAJPAYEE'S TRUST OR DID HE LACK THE CAPACITY TO HONOUR IT?; CONCLUSION; NOTES; 8: USA-Iran, 2009-2010; A 'SINGLE ROLL OF THE DICE'?; THE OBAMA-KHAMENEI CHANNEL AND THE GREEN MOVEMENT.
Includes bibliographical references and index.