rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Nuclear politics
    sub title: the strategic causes of proliferation
  name:
    name part: Debs, Alexandre
    role:
      role term: creator
    role:
      role term: author.
  name:
    name part: Monteiro, Nuno P.
    role:
      role term: author.
  type of resource: text
  genre: bibliography
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: nyu
    date issued: 2017
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: print
    form: regular print
    extent: xxvii, 618 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.
  abstract: When do states acquire nuclear weapons? Overturning a decade of scholarship focusing on other factors, Debs and Monteiro show in Nuclear Politics that proliferation is driven by security concerns. Proliferation occurs only when a state has both the willingness and opportunity to build the bomb. A state has the willingness to nuclearize when it faces a serious security threat without the support of a reliable ally. It has the opportunity when its conventional forces or allied protection are sufficient to deter preventive attacks. This explains why so few countries have developed nuclear weapons. Unthreatened or protected states do not want them; weak and unprotected ones cannot get them. This powerful theory combined with extensive historical research on the nuclear trajectory of sixteen countries will make Nuclear Politics a standard reference in international security studies, informing scholarly and policy debates on nuclear proliferation - and US non-proliferation efforts - for decades to come.--
  table of contents: Figures and tables; Abbreviations and acronyms; Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. A strategic theory of nuclear proliferation; 3. The historical patterns of nuclear proliferation; 4. Adversaries and proliferation; 5. Loose allies and proliferation; 6. Close allies and proliferation; 7. Conclusion; Appendix 1. Coding rules; Appendix 2. Other cases of nuclear development; Appendix 3. Puzzling cases of no nuclear development; Appendix 4. Formal theory; Bibliography; Index.
  note: Alexandre Debs, Department of Political Science, Yale University, Nuno P. Monteiro, Department of Political Science, Yale University.
  note: Includes bibliographical references (pages 533-593) and index.
  subject:
    topic: Nuclear nonproliferation
  subject:
    topic: Nuclear weapons
    topic: Government policy
  subject:
    topic: Strategic culture
  subject:
    topic: Nuclear nonproliferation
  subject:
    topic: Nuclear weapons
    topic: Government policy
  subject:
    topic: Strategic culture
  subject:
    topic: Atomstrategie
  subject:
    topic: Besitz
  subject:
    topic: Kernwaffe
  classification: U264 .D444 2017
  classification: 355.02/17
  classification: 341.67 D430
  classification: MK 3600
  related item:
    title info:
      title: Cambridge studies in international relations ; 142
  identifier: 9781107108097
  identifier: 1107108098
  identifier: 9781107518575
  identifier: 1107518571
  identifier: 2016027169
  identifier: Cambridge Univ Pr, 1120 Rte 22 East, Bridgewater, NJ, USA, 08807
  record info:
    record content source: DLC
    record creation date: 160611
    record change date: 20190122134034.0
    record identifier: in00004015700
    language of cataloging:
      language term: eng