rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: JFK and de Gaulle
    sub title: how America and France failed in Vietnam, 1961-1963
  name:
    name part: McLaughlin, Sean J.
    name part: 1978-
    role:
      role term: creator
    role:
      role term: author.
  type of resource: text
  genre: bibliography
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: kyu
    date issued: 2019
    copyright date: 2019
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: print
    extent: 279 pages ; 24 cm.
  abstract: At the end of January 1963, France's ambassador to the United States, Hervé Alphand, reported back to Paris on a top-secret American exercise at Camp David that revealed many of the stark differences between the two NATO allies. As Alphand, the Kennedy administration had decided the previous October to include representatives from Britain, France and West Germany in a three-day series of politico-military simulations of potential conflict scenarios in divided Berlin. A French team took part in a series of strategic, limited conflict, and politico-military simulations from November 23 to 25, 1962, and while Alphand was impressed by the sheer planning and intellectual energy that went into this undertaking, he saw its glaring shortcomings. An exercise that Americans saw as a rational approach to the exigencies of the Cold War, the French found utterly dehumanizing. Intuition was discouraged, hindering creativity, yet the Americans believed that they could employ these methods to foresee every possible outcome during a given crisis, including the Vietnam War. In JFK and de Gaulle, Sean J. McLaughlin delves into the study of interstate Franco-American relations during the Kennedy presidency. He explains how John F. Kennedy came to view France as a world power from his college days at Harvard through to the end of his pre-presidential political career, while also exploring how and why France and the United States disagreed over the proper western strategy for the Vietnam War. McLaughlin also explores how de Gaulle's government made vigilant attempts to convince Kennedy that US military intervention in South Vietnam would backfire horribly. Hhowever, Kennedy chose not to heed de Gaulle's advice because he did not take France seriously as a member of the Atlantic alliance.
  table of contents: Cultural imaging of the French "other" -- Building the perfect candidate -- Masculinity and modernization in Democratic Party politics during the 1950s -- Toward the first encounter -- Drinking sour wine -- Making the best of it -- Ignoring nosey Charlie.
  note: Sean J. McLaughlin.
  note: Includes bibliographical references and index.
  subject:
    geographic code: n-us---
    geographic code: e-fr---
  subject:
    name:
      name part: Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald)
      name part: 1917-1963
  subject:
    name:
      name part: Gaulle, Charles de
      name part: 1890-1970
  subject:
    topic: Vietnam War, 1961-1975
    geographic: United States
  subject:
    geographic: United States
    topic: Foreign relations
    geographic: France
  subject:
    geographic: France
    topic: Foreign relations
    geographic: United States
  subject:
    geographic: United States
    topic: Foreign relations
    temporal: 1953-1961
  subject:
    geographic: United States
    topic: Foreign relations
    temporal: 1961-1963
  classification: DS558 .M425 2019
  classification: 959.704/32
  related item:
    title info:
      title: Studies in conflict, diplomacy, and peace
  identifier: 9780813177748
  identifier: 081317774X
  identifier: 9780813177762
  identifier: 9780813177779
  identifier: 2019014999
  record info:
    record content source: DLC
    record creation date: 190411
    record change date: 20191021082002.0
    record identifier: in00003988345