Learning from experience. Volume II, Lessons from the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia submarine programs /

Large, complex submarine design and construction programs demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences for successful program management, the U.S. Navy asked the RAND Corporati...

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Bibliographic Details
Corporate Authors: Acquisition and Technology Policy Center, Rand Corporation, United States. Navy, JSTOR (Organization)
Other Authors: Schank, John F. (John Frederic), 1946-, Ip, Cesse, LaCroix, F. W., Murphy, Robert E., Arena, Mark V., Kamarck, Kristy N., Lee, Gordon T., 1953-
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Santa Monica, CA : RAND, 2011.
Subjects:
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Description
Summary:Large, complex submarine design and construction programs demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences for successful program management, the U.S. Navy asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine programs that could help inform future program managers. This volume presents lessons from three submarine programs. The RAND team looked at how the programs were managed, the issues that affected management decisions, and the outcomes of those decisions. All three submarine programs had tenuous beginnings. Each experienced cost overruns and schedule delays in the construction of its first-of-class submarine. The Ohio and Virginia programs made corrections, and both are viewed as generally successful. Seawolf, probably due to the changing threat and budgetary environment, was terminated before changes could be made to correct early missteps. An overarching lesson from the three programs is the importance of program stability. Stability applies in many areas--funding consistency, a long-term build strategy, fixed operational requirements, program management, and an integrated partnership between the Navy and the shipbuilders.
Item Description:"RAND National Defense Research Institute."
"This research was conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Pg. IV.
Electronic resource.
Physical Description:1 online resource (xxxi, 121 pages) : illustrations (some color)
Bibliography:Includes bibliographical references (pages 117-121).
ISBN:9780833058966
0833058967
9780833059031
0833059033
9780833077561
0833077562