rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Two Essays in Corporate Finance
  name:
    name part: Alanis Hernandez, Emmanuel
    role:
      role term: creator
    role:
      role term: author.
  name:
    name part: Johnson, Shane A.
    role:
      role term: thesis advisor.
  name:
    name part: Texas A & M University
    role:
      role term: degree granting institution.
  type of resource: text
  genre: bibliography
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: txu
    date issued: 2015
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: remote
    extent: 1 online resource.
  abstract: In this dissertation, we answer two research question in corporate finance. In the first essay, "A New Benchmark: Relative Performance Evaluation with Total Returns", we revisit the question of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in executive compensation. While previous literature has commonly rejected the use of RPE when using equity returns as performance measure, we argue that the total return of the firm is a preferable metric in RPE regressions since the exogenous common shocks analyzed in extant theory occur at the asset level. Further, it is plausible that executives are concerned about the total value of the firm since shareholders bear most of the brunt of the agency cost of other stakeholders and executives can hold nontrivial amounts of debt-like instruments. We find strong evidence in support of RPE in the compensation of top executives. In addition, we cannot reject that the magnitude of RPE used in the average contract is optimal. Overall, this essay contributes to the ongoing debate about the efficiency of executive pay. In the second essay, "Shareholder Bargaining Power, Debt Overhang, and Investment", we analyze how shareholder bargaining power affects the underinvestment problem caused by debt overhang. Using a dynamic model of strategic bargaining between equity and debt holders following default, we relate firm-specific characteristics, such as the shareholder and bondholder ownership concentration, to debt overhang and investment. Consistent with our predictions, we find expected liquidation values and bondholder ownership concentration enhance the underinvestment effect of debt overhang, while shareholder ownership concentration mitigates it. Our results highlight how shareholder bargaining power in default can affect the underinvestment problem caused by debt overhang. The electronic version of this dissertation is accessible from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/155471
  note: by Emmanuel Alanis Hernandez.
  note: "Major Subject: Finance"
  note: Includes vita.
  note: Doctor of Philosophy Texas A & M University 2015 http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/155471
  note: Includes bibliographical references.
  note: Text (Dissertation)
  subject:
    topic: Major Finance
  subject:
    topic: Compensation
  subject:
    topic: Investment
  identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/155471
  record info:
    record content source: TXA
    record creation date: 160907
    record change date: 20170926144538.0
    record identifier: in00003742632
    language of cataloging:
      language term: eng