An Identity Theory of Truth /

Dodd explains that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation between true thought and fact is identity, not correspondence. Facts are not complexes of worldly entities which make thoughts true; they are merely true thoughts. The resulting modest identity theory allows for a defensib...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Dodd, Julian (Author)
Corporate Author: SpringerLink (Online service)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: London : Palgrave Macmillan UK : Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
Subjects:
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Description
Summary:Dodd explains that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation between true thought and fact is identity, not correspondence. Facts are not complexes of worldly entities which make thoughts true; they are merely true thoughts. The resulting modest identity theory allows for a defensible deflation of the concept of truth.
Item Description:Electronic resource.
Physical Description:1 online resource (XI, 200 pages)
ISBN:9780230584266
DOI:10.1057/9780230584266