http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
This collection of twenty papers deals with a wide range of issues in philosophy of language, epistemology, history of philosophy, philosophy of psychology, jurisprudence and philosophy of science. It should be of interest to, and prove a stimulus for new work by, researchers and practitioners working in any of these fields. Tracing a route backwards through the papers as presented here, the final group is largely concerned with how empirical knowledge may be acquired through evidence in states of uncertainty; the middle group explores how such evidence often requires or results in conceptual innovation and is given to us in language the meaning of which may be difficult to determine; the first group explores how a theory of meaning can be constructed for natural and artificial languages. The papers exhibit a distinctive analytical perspective and a great deal of thematic continuity, underpinned by commitment to the richness both of language and of enquiry and opposition to simplistic or dogmatic formalisations and analyses.
Preface. Introduction -- 1. On the Project of a Universal Character -- 2. On a Concept of Degree of Grammaticalness -- 3. The Semantics of Metaphor -- 4. Can the Logic of Indirect Discourse be Formalised?- 5. Grice's Views About the Logical Particles of Natural Language -- 6. Can the Conversationalist Hypothesis be Defended?- 7. How is Conceptual Innovation Possible?- 8. Natural Language Definitions -- 9. A Problem About Ambiguity in Truth-Theoretical Semantics -- 10. The Individuation of Proper Names -- 11. Third World Epistemology -- 12. Guessing -- 13. Bayesianism versus Baconianism in the Evaluation of Medical Diagnoses -- 14. Are People Programmed to Commit Fallacies?- 15. Inductive Logic 1945-1977 -- 16. Some Remarks on the Baconian Conception of Probability -- 17. Twelve Questions about Keynes's Concept of Weight -- 18. Some Steps towards a General Theory of Relevance -- 19. Should a Jury Say What it Believes or what it Accepts?- 20. Ethical Reasons for Being, or not Being, a Scientific Realist.
Boston studies in the philosophy of science ; 227