Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information /
This book takes three different approaches to the two-person bargaining problem with incomplete information: The game theoretic analysis, the study of the spontaneous behavior of subjects in a game playing experiment, and the investigation of strategies programmed by highly experienced subjects in a...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Berlin, Heidelberg :
Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
1994.
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| Series: | Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems ;
412. |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Connect to the full text of this electronic book |
| Summary: | This book takes three different approaches to the two-person bargaining problem with incomplete information: The game theoretic analysis, the study of the spontaneous behavior of subjects in a game playing experiment, and the investigation of strategies programmed by highly experienced subjects in a strategy experiment. The two different experimental approaches allow to study the bargaining behavior which emerges spontaneously in interactive plays of two subjects, and moreover the instructions experienced subjects give to a representative. The three approaches together provide a vivid picture of theoretical and experimentally observed behavior in the two-person bargaining problem. The synopsis of these different approaches is a novelty in the analysis of boundedly rational behavior. |
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| Item Description: | Electronic resource. |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (ix, 293 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9783642487774 (electronic bk.) 3642487777 (electronic bk.) |
| ISSN: | 0075-8442 ; |